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FOUNDED IN 1918 BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

VOLUME XLI

JANUARY 1959

NUMBER I

THE DATE OF ECCLESIASTICUS

By A. HAIRE FORSTER

Evanston, Illinois

The period of the Apocrypha is the period in which Europe and Asia and Africa were brought into close contact as a result of Alexander the Great's conquests and the Greek political system of city states was being combined with the remnants of Oriental monarchies.

It was the period in which the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies began and spread. Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia (283-239), was the friend and admirer of Zeno of Cyprus, the founder of Stoicism. The statement in Wisd. 17:12, "Fear is nothing but the abandonment of the succours that come from reasoning," is almost a Stoic commonplace. Fourth Maccabees is written to illustrate the Stoic doctrine of the superiority of reason to the feelings. Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria (175-163), the persecutor of the Jews in the time of the Maccabees and the braggart beast of the Book of Daniel, was an adherent of the Stoic philosophy in the beginning of his reign, but later became a convert to Epicureanism.

The period of the Apocrypha is also the period of the Ptolemies of Egypt. The line of the Ptolemies lasted for about three hundred years, from 323 B.C. to 30 B.C. It began with Ptolemy Soter, a playmate and some said a half-brother of Alexander the Great and afterwards one of Alexander's most trusted generals, it ended with Caesarion or Ptolemy XIV, a son of Cleopatra and Julius Caesar.

It is also the period in which Rome grew from the condition of a small Italian state to that of master of the Mediterranean world. Over all this area, now the turbulent Middle East, the Greek language be-

came the common speech, hence in Egypt the Jews had to translate their Hebrew scriptures into Greek (the so-called Septuagint), and the books of the Apocrypha were either written in Greek, as Wisdom and Second Maccabees, or translated into Greek, as Ecclesiasticus and First Maccabees.

The wide extent of the Greek language is shown by the fact that a first century doctor in the mountains of Persia was given, as part of his fee, a document in Greek, the title deeds of a vineyard of the date 88 B. C.

It was not only the Greek language that spread in this period. The scene of the Book of Tobit is partly in Nineveh, partly in Ecbatana, the scene of Susanna and the Elders is in Babylon, Wisdom was written in Egypt, Ecclesiasticus was written in Hebrew in Palestine and translated into Greek in Egypt. Like the Greek language, the Jews, as captives or as traders or as emigrants, were to be found all over the known world.

In his *Empire of the Ptolemies*, Dr. Mahaffy suggests that the marked favor which Alexander showed to the Jews was because they were practically his intelligence department: they knew the best routes, where supplies were available and the climates of every region. In his *Contra Apion* Josephus quotes Hecataeus of Abdera, a writer who was with Alexander, in a story of a Jew who was a guide in Alexander's army and renowned as the best archer among either Greeks or barbarians. Dr. Mahaffy's book is referred to more than once by Dr. Swete in his *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* and might have been used to advantage by some other writers on the period.

Mahaffy quotes frequently the Greek historian Polybius, a contemporary of Ptolemy VII, i. e. Euergetes II, who may be the Euergetes mentioned in the prologue to Ecclesiasticus. This Euergetes was nicknamed Physcon, a word that could be coarsely translated "pot-bellied" or more elegantly "well rounded." Polybius twice visited Alexandria and met this rotund monarch. Polybius was a close friend of the Scipio who finally captured and destroyed Carthage; these two stood together and watched Carthage burn. Plutarch tells the story that this Scipio on a visit to Alexandria was walking through the city in a company which included King Euergetes. The king, owing to his fat, had difficulty in keeping up with the party and Scipio whispered to his friend Panaetius, the Stoic philosopher, "Already the Alexandrians have

gained something from our visit, for thanks to us, they have seen their king walking."

In his history of the period, Mahaffy also uses the evidence of the numerous documents and letters known as papyri which have been discovered in Egypt written on papyrus, a paper made from the pith of a reed growing in the Nile and preserved in the sand by the dry climate of Egypt. These writings reveal "the short and simple annals of the poor," the decrees of the kings, the regulations of the officials, and the complaints of the mistreated. Their form may be illustrated by extracts from a petition dated 163 B. C. and addressed by twin sisters, attendants in the Serapeum, the temple at Memphis, to the reigning Ptolemies on the occasion of a royal visit, "To King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra the sister, gods Philometores, greeting. Thauus and Taous are twins who minister in the great Serapeum at Memphis—we are not receiving the contribution of necessities which it is fitting should be given to us—we have been compelled, under pressure of necessity, wasting away as we are through starvation to petition you—we beg you therefore having as our one hope the assistance that lies in your power—so that when we have everything in order, we may be much better able to perform our regular duties to Serapis and to Isis—may it be given to you to hold fast all the territories you desire. Farewell" (Paris Papyri 26). Later documents, it is pleasant to note, show that these unhappy girls got the supplies due to them. If anyone should wish to study a totalitarian and bureaucratic government at work, the Egyptian papyri will supply their needs. In theory, all land was owned by the king and he had monopolies on corn, oil, beer and other commodities.

A regulation issued by the minister of finance in the third century B. C. to provincial governors contains this sentence, "You must regard it as one of your most indispensable duties to see that the province be sown with the kind of crops prescribed by the sowing schedule."

The whole system was applied by the Ptolemies following earlier Egyptian rulers and made more rigorous by their Roman successors. "It can be said that Egypt was already in the Ptolemaic and still more in the Roman periods dominated by the baleful notion which in the Byzantine age casts its shadow over the whole Empire, that the individual exists for the state and not the state for the individual" (*The Legacy of Egypt* [Oxford, 1942], p. 299).

One of the difficulties in the history of the Ptolemaic period is that

the numbers of the Ptolemies vary in different lists. Two of them only lasted a few months and are not counted in some lists, hence Ptolemy Euergetes II is sometimes Ptolemy VII, sometimes Ptolemy IX, and furthermore their divine titles, Soter, Euergetes, etc. are in a few cases repeated.

There were two Ptolemy *Euergetes* and one of the problems in connection with the date of *Ecclesiasticus* is caused by this duplication. The queens also have often the same name. There are several Arsinoes and the Cleopatra of the twins' petition is the second of the name. The famous queen of Shakespeare's play was Cleopatra VII. Cleopatra II was the wife and sister of Ptolemy Philometor, and as a widow married his brother and hers, Euergetes II. To add to the confusion, Euergetes divorced her and married his niece Cleopatra III. Here we have a rather unusual triangle and yet at the end they seem to have agreed to rule together. A decree of Euergetes dated 118 B. C. begins, "King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra the sister and Queen Cleopatra the wife proclaim an amnesty to all their subjects for errors, crimes, accusations, condemnations and charges of all kinds up to the ninth of Pharmouthi (April) of the 52nd year, except to persons guilty of murder or sacrilege" (Tebtunis Papyri 5). As this decree indicates, the reign of Euergetes was marked by disturbances due to his dispute with his wife and sister Cleopatra II and also with his brother Philometor. Philometor and Euergetes reigned together from 170 to 146 when Philometor died and Euergetes became sole king. Philometor and Cleopatra were supported by the Jews against Euergetes who therefore became reckoned as an Antisemite. Josephus is largely responsible for this charge. In his *Contra Apion*, ii. 5, he tells a tale of Euergetes conducting a massacre of Jews in Alexandria with the assistance of drunken elephants. However, much the same story is told of Ptolemy Philopator in Third Maccabees and Josephus, like some other writers may have been confused as to "who's who" among the Ptolemies. On the whole Euergetes II had what we would call a "bad press." He seems to have taken the side of the native Egyptians and this offended his Greek subjects who thought that the natives should be kept in their place and that a low one. In the *Tebtunis Papyri* Part I, edited by Grenfell, Hunt and Smyly, we read (p. 19), "It is to the credit of Euergetes II that he faced and went far to solve the difficult problem that most of his predecessors had been unable or unwilling to attempt, the

fusion of the heterogeneous nationalities of his subjects into one community with comparatively equal rights."

When Alexander the Great died in 323 B. C. there began among his generals a scramble for his empire and as boundaries were indefinite there were constant wars. In the period between 323 and 30 B. C. there were five wars between Syria under the Seleucids and Egypt under the Ptolemies. Egypt lost almost all her outside possessions except the island of Cyprus and for a brief period Egypt itself was conquered by Antiochus Epiphanes, the persecutor of the Jews. He was repulsed not by Egyptian valor, but by orders from the Roman Senate. Egypt is well protected by deserts on both sides and a difficult sea coast, so that with the exception of this incursion by Antiochus, it was probably the most peaceful part of the world throughout the period. Palestine was in a very different situation; it was the prize for which Syria and Egypt usually fought and Jerusalem was several times occupied by one or other. It is easy to understand the attraction Egypt had for Jews. In Josephus' *Antiquities*, Book XII, Chapter one, he relates how Ptolemy I Soter took Jerusalem and then removed many Jewish captives to Egypt and gave them many privileges there. Josephus then adds "There were not a few other Jews, who of their own accord went into Egypt, invited by the goodness of the soil and by the liberality of Ptolemy."

Long before Alexandria was founded, there were Jews settled in Egypt. In Jer. 44:1 we read, "The word that came to Jeremiah concerning all the Jews living in the land of Egypt—at Migdol, Tahpanes, Memphis and in the land of Pathros" (upper Egypt).

When the translator of Ecclesiasticus writes, "When I came to Egypt in the thirty-eight year of the reign of Euergetes and stayed for some time" (R. S. V.), it is usually assumed that he settled in Alexandria, but this is not certain. In the papyri and in Greek writers, Alexandria, a distinctly Greek city though with a large Jewish population, is sometimes described as Alexandria *next* (*pros*) Egypt. An Alexandrian would not call himself an Egyptian.

Other questions are suggested by the short statement of the translator. What does "in the 38th year" mean? It is generally taken to mean the 38th year of Euergetes II (Physcon) who reigned along with his brother Ptolemy Philometor from 170 to 145 and then alone from 146 to 116. Starting from 170, the 38th year of Euergetes would be 132

B. C. and thus the date of the translation is generally reckoned as having been made in the years immediately after 132 B. C.

Another question comes up at this point. When and where did the translator learn Greek? Josephus in *Ant.* xx.11.2 writes, "Our nation does not encourage those that learn the languages of many nations"—he adds that learning a language was regarded as an accomplishment for freedmen and slaves. If the translator did not learn Greek in Jerusalem, it must have been several years before he was ready for his task.

It is a pity that neither Josephus nor anyone else, so far as I know, tells how he learned Greek. The method, whatever it was, proved successful, though we know of no Greek grammar until that of Dionysius the Thracian who taught in Rome about 80 B. C., and there were no Greek dictionaries.

The translator says that the book was written by his grandfather (*pappos*) which, if we take the 38th year as 132, would bring us to about 180. That would mean in the reign of Ptolemy Epiphanes (203-181) or Ptolemy Philometor (181-145). But here another question arises: does *pappos* mean grandfather? Aristotle uses it of "ancestor," just as the latin *avus* can mean both grandfather and ancestor. *Pappos* as ancestor in the translator's prologue is possible but not probable.

The meaning of "in the 38th year" is capable of three interpretations. First the now commonly accepted one: the 38th year of Euergetes II, that is 132 B. C. This meaning is supported by the Greek of Hag. 1.1, and 2:1 and Zech. 7:1 where, in each case, a similar phrase is found.

There happens to be a petition among the *Amherst Papyri*, No. 35, which is also dated in the 38th year of Euergetes II and throws an interesting side light on religion and life in Egypt at that date. The petition is addressed to Apollonius the magistrate "from the priests of the great god Socnopaeus" (one of the crocodile gods of the Fayum) and complains that, "on the 18th of Epeiph [c. June 23] of the 38th year, the chief priest Petesouchus had raided their wheat supply while they were away in Crocodilopolis (the chief town of the district) on business.

A second possible meaning is "in my 38th year." The Greek is *en tō* but the Greek article was originally a pronoun, demonstrative or possessive, and is so used in Homer. In Ecclus. 10:4, *tō* means *your* and in the *Fayum Towns and their Papyri*, Nos. 117 and 119, *Tō* means *my*. In my 38th year is vehemently supported by Westcott in

Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* and as vehemently denied by Stanley in his *History of the Jewish Church*, Vol. III, p. 266. Mahaffy translates my 38th year (*Ptolemaic Empire*, p. 390). If it is my 38th year, then the date of Ecclesiasticus is up in the air. If this is the meaning, the translator was perhaps showing that he was sufficiently mature for his difficult task. A third possibility is suggested by Hart in his commentary, *Ecclesiasticus in Greek* (Cambridge, 1909). It is as follows: Ptolemy II Philadelphus reigned 38 years (285-247) and was succeeded by his son Euergetes I; the 38th year means the last year of Philadelphus and the first of Euergetes.

In favor of this theory is the fact that Philadelphus was delicate, the great Buddhist King Asoka sent him healing herbs from India for his health and at the time of his death, his son might have been acting as king and the sentence might mean, "In the 38th year [of Philadelphus] when Euergetes was in fact ruling, Philadelphus had himself been coopted by his father Ptolemy Soter and was king for two years before his father's death. A letter of the *Zenon Papyri* begins, "In the 27th year of the reign of Ptolemy son of Ptolemy and of his son Ptolemy. The rest of the letter (it is about the sale of a slave) shows that the Ptolemies mentioned are I, II and III, and here Euergetes I is definitely a co-ruler with his father. If the theory of Hart is correct, and it is at least ingenious, the date of the translation would be the years after 247, and the original work would be about 295 B. C.

A theory which has not, so far as I know, been advanced is that the prologue means "my 38th year" but the king is Antiochus VII of Syria (139-129) who was also called *Euergetes*. This Syrian King would be the Euergetes best known to a Jerusalem Jew for Antiochus VII captured Jerusalem in 133 after a long siege and, for the Jews, an extreme scarcity of food (*Cambridge Ancient History*, VIII, 530).

This theory would not affect the commonly accepted date of Ecclesiasticus and it suggests a reason for the translator's decision to move to Egypt. The independence of Judaea won by the Maccabean brothers would seem to be lost "in the time of Euergetes" the Syrian king.

For those who are in doubt about the meaning of "in the 38th year of the reign of Euergetes," the date of Ecclesiasticus must be settled on other grounds. Euergetes I reigned from 247 to 221 and Egypt was at peace for the last twenty years of his reign. He was interested in mathematics and Mahaffy says of his reign, "At no time was the Mu-

seum more flourishing and famous" (*Empire of the Ptolemies*, p. 207). The Museum, that is the Temple of the Muses (it had its own priest) was what we would call a University and, like the original University of Paris, it had no students. It was a place in which astronomers, mathematicians, poets and the "lovers of learning" that the translator of Ecclesiasticus refers to, could live and work. The translator would not be "at the Museum" but the "atmosphere" at Alexandria would be favorable for such a person about the year 240 B. C. The time of Euergetes II would not be so favorable, although the disturbances of his reign seem to have settled down by the year 130 and his Antisemitism has probably been exaggerated.

The translator's reason for migrating to Egypt is quite uncertain. It might be political conditions or private affairs or personal prejudices. His prologue presents other difficulties in addition to "the 38th year of Euergetes." It continues, "I found opportunity for no little instruction" (R. S. V.); "I found a book of no small learning" (A. V.); "I found opportunity of [imparting] no small amount of instruction" (Oesterley in his S. P. C. K. edition, 1916). What exactly did the translator find? A book or a copy or an opportunity. "Opportunity" is not a translation of *aphomoion*, the word in most manuscripts which might possibly mean copy; "opportunity" is a translation of a Greek word *aphormē* found in a very few Greek manuscripts. In any case the writer of the prologue did translate in Egypt a Hebrew work written by his *pappos*.

The Prologue of Ecclesiasticus requires a special study. Its clumsy Greek is full of those compound verbs which are so common in Hellenistic writers and often so hard to translate; there are about eighteen of them in this short piece. Their meaning in the Septuagint and the Egyptian papyri should be compared with this prologue.

On the whole the prologue raises more questions as to the date and origin of Ecclesiasticus than it settles.

In chapter 51 of Ecclesiasticus there is a glowing description of Simon the High Priest, son of Onias, when he was, as we would say "officiating at the altar." "He was as the morning star in the midst of a cloud and the moon at the full," and so on for several verses. This section reads like a description based on the author's vivid impressions as he watched the High Priest at the altar. It is also a reminder of something that earnest biblicists sometimes forget, that the Bible is an *oriental* book and its exuberant language is not always to be taken

literally. There were two high priests called Simon in the Ptolemaic period and each of them had a father, Onias. The first, called Simon the Just, is the famous teacher quoted in the *Sayings of the Fathers* of the Jewish Mishnah. Simon the Just used to say, "By three things is the world sustained, by the Law, by the Temple service and by deeds of kindness." The book of Ecclesiasticus is quite in harmony with this trio. This Simon was one of the *sopherim* (book men) and also a priest and flourished about 300-270 B. C. (so stated by Oesterley and Box in their *Survey of Jewish Literature*). Simon II is hard to identify. A High Priest Simon is mentioned in III Macc. 2:1 where he utters a long prayer which is promptly answered. Nothing else is said about him and the historical value of III Maccabees is doubtful. This Simon is usually known as Simon II and his time is that of the reign of Ptolemy Philopator (221-203), the Ptolemy of III Maccabees. He appears in the twelfth book of Josephus' *Antiquities*, but nothing remarkable is told about him. In face such reputation as he has, he has obtained by being identified with the figure in Ecclus. 50. Of this figure Schürer is cited as saying, "There is no doubt that Simon the Just was the High Priest" (*N. T. Zeitgeschichte*, p. 453). Simon the Just according to Josephus was a contemporary of the first and second Ptolemies and was almost a century earlier than the rather elusive Simon II.

The identification of the Simon of chapter 50 might be settled by one discovery. What high priest fortified not only the Temple but the city? (cf. 50: 2-4). Other questions: What does "the 38th year" mean? Which of the two Euergetes is the Euergetes of the prologue? Why did the translator migrate to Egypt? Where and how did he learn Greek?

Eb. Nestle concludes his article on Ecclesiasticus in Hastings' *Dictionary* with these prophetic words. "It will be a long time before all the questions connected with Sirach are settled."

A STUDY OF JOHN DONNE'S *SONNET XIV*

By WILLOUGHBY NEWTON

St. Andrew's Church, Marble Dale, Connecticut

There are always a few poems, poems which have come to have special meaning for us as individuals, which we can read again and again with pleasure and edification. They never cloy nor grow thin and transparent from repeated reading. The glimpse of reality which they provide never loses the power to stir the heart and the mind. Such a poem for me is John Donne's *Sonnet XIV*.

And from time to time these poems have their interest heightened for us by some insight which comes from another source, a source, not infrequently, with little or no seeming immediate relevance. It is as if a whole new level of significance has been exposed, and the poem has become as new for us. Such an insight into the meaning of *Sonnet XIV* came to me while reading Dr. Paul Tillich's *Love, Power and Justice* (London, 1954).

In this volume, it will be remembered, Tillich presents an ontological discussion of the three concepts which give the work its title. In the context of what he calls the ultimate relation, he defines and interprets these concepts as they are discernible in the relation between God and man. He defines *love* as "the drive toward the unity of the separated. . . . Therefore love cannot be described as the union of the strange but as the reunion of the estranged." Love is a passion: "Infinite passion for God as described by Kierkegaard is, no less than sexual passion, a consequence of the objective situation, namely, of the state of separation of those who belong together and are driven towards each other in love." After defining the *erōs* quality of love, rejecting the purely sexual connotation and distinguishing it from *epithymia*, he warns us that it is dangerous and incorrect to reject the *erōs* quality of love in considering man's relation to God.

Power, according to Dr. Tillich, presupposes power over something: "Power is real only in its actualization . . . in the encounter with other bearers of power." In such encounters power requires compulsion to overcome that which threatens it and to achieve union with that which

it seeks to unite with: compulsion is in conflict with love only when it prevents reunion.

Justice is the "form in which the power of being actualizes itself, the form of the reunion of the separated." There is no essential conflict between justice and compulsion for it is not "compulsion which violates justice, but a compulsion which disregards the intrinsic claim of a being to be acknowledged as what it is within the context of all beings."

In *Sonnet XIV* Donne suggests an understanding of the relationship between God and man which involves these concepts. The poem reads as follows:

Batter my heart, three-personed God; for you
As yet but knock, breathe, shine, and seek to mend,
That I may rise and stand, O'erthrow me and bend
Your force to break, blow, burn, and make me new.
I, like an usurped town, to another due,
Labor to admit you, but, Oh, to no end:
Reason, your viceroy in me, me should defend,
But is captived and proves weak and untrue.
Yet dearly I love you and would be loved fain,
But am betrothed unto your enemy:
Divorce me, untie or break that knot again,
Take me to you, imprison me, for I
Except you enthrall me, never shall be free,
Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.

A careful reading of the sonnet indicates the nature of the situation which gives rise to this impassioned plea. Donne realizes himself to be subjected by Sin which has usurped the place of God in his life. This usurpation he is powerless to overthrow alone. God must deliver him from the bondage into which he has fallen, and this can only be done by the imposition of God's will upon his own.

While ignoring the urgency of the tone and the impressive technical and poetic qualities of the poem, these being irrelevant to our present consideration, we must nevertheless study the metaphors which convey to us the necessary understanding of Donne's conception of love, and of justice. This conception, I suggest, is more meaningful when illuminated by the insight garnered from Tillich's little book.

The metaphors are essentially metaphors of power, but the poem itself is a poem concerned with love. The centrality of love is indicated not only by the lines which refer explicitly to love, not only by the striking echoes of some of Donne's earlier erotic poetry, but by the use of the metaphors which are meaningless out of the context of the inti-

mate interrelation of power with love and justice, as this interrelation is seen in the poet's desire for reunion with God. Aware of the separation which is the result of sin, he beseeches God to use his coercive power to overcome the undesired but willful estrangement which sin has caused. He realizes the extent of the power of God, and he recognizes that that power, to be effectively actualized, must employ force: a compulsion which, as Tillich notes, is essential to power.

Metaphorically Donne is a usurped town, subject to the power and control of "another," but one which desires to have the power of God manifested to restore it to His suzerainty; he is a vessel or some sort of metal utensil, which needs more than reparation, which needs to be recreated in God's smithy; he is a betrothed woman who would have her unwelcomed tie to another forcefully destroyed by God, and who is willing to submit herself to the imposition of the greater power of God. Each of these metaphors, and perhaps most strikingly the last (especially in the context of the whole of Donne's poetry), suggests the same idea: God, to return Donne's submissive love, to be just to Donne as a sinner, and to reunite Donne to Himself, must impose His power by using a compulsion which is true to that power, and which, rather than denying love and justice, is truly an expression of them.

This compulsion is fundamentally different from the compulsion by which sin has subjected him, for sin was in conflict with love, causing separation, denying the possibility of reunion, and betraying his personality; it "bypassed the center" of his being by violating that aspect of him which makes him a person. Reason and will have been subdued by the power of sin. This subjugation is an example of unjust compulsion because sin, or rather evil, has disregarded the "intrinsic claim of being to be acknowledged as what it is." The compulsion which Donne requests God to impose upon him, on the other hand, would be an expression of love and justice because it would bring about reunion and would end the estrangement from God, without bypassing the center of Donne's being.

Finally, it should be noted that the sexual metaphor at the end of the poem is particularly appropriate, for as Tillich tells us, "sexual desire and sexual autonomy are evil if they bypass the center of the other person—in other words, if they are not united with the two other qualities of love, and if they are not under the ultimate criterion of the *agapē* quality of love. *Agapē* seeks the other one in his center. *Agapē* sees him as God sees him. *Agapē* elevates libido into the divine unity of love, power, and justice."

PURITAN ELOQUENCE: THE SERMONS OF SAMUEL WARD OF IPSWICH

By DOROTHY J. PARKANDER

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Many studies have been made of the "plain style" characteristic of Puritan sermons during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. However, not all Puritan preachers felt convinced that plainness increased the power or piety of the sermon, and some of the most popular Puritans indulged in witty conceits and flowers of eloquence with an enthusiasm comparable to the displays of the ornate preachers of the court of James I. It would be surprising if this were not the case, for the Puritans, like their Anglican brothers, were trained from childhood in the rhetorical traditions of Quintilian and Cicero. But usually one finds that when a Puritan preacher cultivated a "florid" style, he took pains either to justify his practice by a reference to the eloquence of the Scriptures, or to hide his own tricks under attacks on the excesses of ornament in others.

Among the most interesting and, to modern readers, least known of the orators of the Puritan pulpit is Samuel Ward, preacher and lecturer in Ipswich from 1604 to 1635. Ward's contribution to the bulk of published sermons during the Jacobean period is slight: one small collection of nine sermons. Only one modern edition of them has been made, and that unobtrusively attached to the *Works* of Thomas Adams, issued in 1862.¹ Yet even a cursory reading of these nine sermons reveals Ward's mastery of the art of rhetoric and offers further evidence of the astonishing versatility of the Puritan pulpit.

Like many Puritans, Ward walked the tight-rope between his audience's approval and ecclesiastical disfavor. In 1621, when he was forty-four years old, he was briefly imprisoned for drawing and publishing an indiscreet cartoon which the Spanish Ambassador, Gondomar,

¹Samuel Ward, *Sermons and Treatises*, ed. by J. C. Ryle (Edinburgh, 1862). The collection includes all the known sermons of Ward: "Christ is All in All;" "The Life of Faith;" "The Life of Faith in Death;" "A Coal from the Altar;" "Balm from Gilead;" "Jethro's Justice of Peace;" "A Peace-Offering to God;" "Woe to Drunkards;" "The Happiness of Practice." All the quotations used are from this edition, based on the edition of 1636.

felt to be insulting to Spain.² He annoyed King Charles by persistent attacks on the Arminianism of the favorite, Richard Montagu.³ His protests against the Book of Sports and other "abuses" sanctioned by the Church were responsible for persuading many to immigrate to Holland, at least in the opinion of the Suffolk commissioner, who feared for the effects on trade.⁴ A thorn in the flesh of Archbishop Laud, he was finally suspended from preaching in 1635 and imprisoned. After his release from prison, he joined the community of English "exiles" in Holland, but before his death around 1640, he returned to Ipswich and was buried in the church which he had served for three decades.⁵

Ward's popularity as a preacher, easily believed by the reader of the nine sermons, gets some amusing testimony. Not long after his election in Ipswich to the pulpit of the municipal church, St. Mary le Tower, he drew such large crowds that two enterprising parishioners, combining piety with a shrewd sense of business, built a gallery at their own expense and rented out the seats.⁶ Even more impressive is the fact that thirty years in the same pulpit did not diminish his popularity. It must have irritated the ecclesiastical authorities, after Ward was silenced, that the townsmen of Ipswich stubbornly refused to elect another lecturer, insisting that they wanted Ward or nobody.⁷

The reason for Ward's hold upon his audience, in so far as one can judge by the sermons, lies in his appeal to the imagination and in his forceful, personal applications. He intended his preaching to rouse men to action and he succeeded, both in the printed and the spoken word. Thirteen year old Samuel Fairclough, later to become a "famous minister," was converted by hearing Ward preach on Christ's meeting with Zacchaeus.⁸ And Sir Simons D'Ewes, after reading Ward's two funeral sermons, records: "I resolved with myself never to give over the disquisition of faith till I had gained an exact knowledge of it. . . ."⁹

In the sermon "A Coal from the Altar," preached before an audience of ministers during an Ipswich visitation, Ward outlines his theory of

²Samuel Gardiner, *History of England*, IV (London, 1884), p. 118.

³Benjamin Brook, *The Lives of the Puritans*, II (London, 1813), p. 454.

⁴*Calendar of State Papers*, 1633-1634, pp. 450 f.

⁵J. C. Ryle, "Memoir of Samuel Ward," attached to *Sermons*, p. x.

⁶John Glyde, *Illustrations of Old Ipswich* (Ipswich, 1889), p. 33.

⁷*Calendar of State Papers*, 1636, p. 223.

⁸Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

⁹Sir Simons D'Ewes, *The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Simon D'Ewes*, I, ed. by J. O. Holland (London, 1845), p. 249.

pulpit rhetoric. He assumes, of course, an educated ministry—he was himself a fellow of Sidney-Sussex College in Cambridge; but learning alone is not sufficient. Preaching must be in the “evidence and demonstration of the Spirit,” to the glory of God, not of the man speaking. He censures the style which is weighed down by quotations because it is ostentatious, indicating the speaker’s desire to prove the strength of his memory and the extent of his reading. And he ridicules as “effeminate” the eloquence which depends for its effects upon “new-minted words” and “offensive paranomasies.” Such art, if art it can be called, violates the grave dignity proper to a sermon. Tully and Demosthenes—and this allusion is significant—would have scorned it. To put an edge on his criticism, Ward offers an example, paradoxically producing a smile at the very moment when he is attacking levity in a sermon:

I blush to fall into the least touch of that kind; yet, at once to shew and reprove that childish folly, ‘It is a vein of vain preaching turning sound preaching into a sound of preaching, tickling men’s ears like a tinkling cymbal . . . , spoiling the plain song with desecant and division’ (p. 88).

Up to this point, Ward’s discussion follows the traditional attitudes of the Puritan clergy. A real break with Puritan theory, however, lies in his refusal to believe that a preacher’s first duty is to teach. It is the emphasis on instruction that produced the “plain style” typical of much Puritan rhetoric: the stress on unadorned exposition of text, on the gathering of doctrines supported by logically arranged proofs and leading to a list of applications. Ward is not a “plain” preacher; he wishes not so much to inform as to move his audience. And whatever devices rhetoric supplies to assist him, he is willing to use. Even the “childish folly” of word and sound play he finds effective on occasion, as his tricks with the words *bier* and *beer* in the sermon on intemperance show. Far more than most Puritans, he sees the necessity of keeping his listeners alert, sympathetic, and responsive. He ignores, for this reason, the distinction between oratory and preaching which advocates of the “plain style” insisted on, and he prefers to consider St. Paul a model for persuasive eloquence rather than for lucid teaching. He would rather, he explains in his sermon at Paul’s Cross,

choose . . . with the apostle, to speak five words to the heart, than ten thousand to the ear . . . , yea, one to shew you a good con-

science, than ten thousand to shew all the science in the world (p. 95).

When Ward goes on, in his visitation sermon, to criticize the "doctrinal, and as some term it doctorly kind of preaching," he is not merely accepting the general idea that a discussion of knotty theological problems is unsuitable for the average auditory because it is obscure. Far more important to his way of thinking is the fact that such preaching "has no teeth." Ministers after all are the "oracles of God," and what they need is zeal, impassioned words delivered vigorously. To do any good, he says,

we must exhort and reprove with all vehemency and authority, lifting up our voice as a trumpet, as the sons of thunder, piercing their ears, witnessing, striving, and contending . . . to manifest our affections. . . . If God require the heart as well as the head, why should we not labour to move the affections as well as inform the judgment? (p. 88).

The results he achieves by following his theory of preaching in no way contradict the major emphasis of the Puritan pulpit: to be, at all costs, practical. Whether a preacher desires to reach men by logical argument or by appeals to their emotions, he wants to direct their actions, to show them how to meet the problems of daily life with Christian virtue. Ward's insistence on the practical can be seen in the subjects he treats: the value of a good conscience, preparation for death, the evils of intemperance, the qualities of an honest magistrate, the importance of good works and of a zealous heart. "The Happiness of Practice," as one of the sermons is entitled, indicates the spirit of all of them. "One apple of the tree of life," he says here with proverb-like force, "hath more sweet relish than ten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil."

But simply the choice of a down-to-earth subject will not give "sweet relish" to a sermon. Ward recognizes the usefulness of dressing up his subject in colors that attract the popular imagination. Like most of the Puritan brotherhood, he no doubt lamented that men crowd eagerly to playhouses but drag reluctant feet to church, that they read avidly the "filthy romances" but fix a sour face upon the Word of God. However, he turns the observation to advantage by acting upon his audience's appetite and using with great success the techniques of narrative and drama.

Almost melodramatic is the opening of the sermon "Woe to Drunkards." Here, in a style meant to remind hearers of Isaiah, Ward begins with a dialogue between himself as prophet and God.

Seer, art thou also blind? Watchman, art thou also drunk or asleep? . . . Up to thy watchtower; what descriest thou? Ah, Lord! what end or number is there of the vanities which mine eyes are weary of beholding? But what seest thou? I see men walking like the tops of trees shaken with the wind, like masts of ships reeling on the tempestuous seas, Drunkenness, I mean . . . And dost thou, like a dumb dog, hold thy peace? . . . Up and arise, lift up thy voice, spare not, and cry aloud. What shall I cry? Cry woe, and woe again, unto the crown of pride, the drunkards of Ephraim . . . (p. 149).

The dialogue does more than startle; it suggests the relevance of the subject, the heinousness of the sin, and the preacher's divine commission to discuss the theme.

The influence of the morality play can be felt in the two funeral sermons, "The Life of Faith" and "The Life of Faith in Death." Here, the solemn text, taken from Rev. 6:7-9, works itself into a vivid allegory that makes a hero out of the Christian, and a fool and coward of the unrepentant sinner. Death rides his pale horse onto the stage of life, terrorizing those who look upon them. The horse viciously stamps out life as easily as "Jehu stamped Jezebel in pieces, and Tamerlane's troops of horse the Turkish footmen."

This winged Pegasus posts and speeds after men, easily gives them law, fetches them up again, gallops and swallows the ground he goes, sets out after man as soon as he comes into the world, and plays with him as the cat with the mouse, as the greyhound with the badger . . . (p. 55).

Realizing that escape is impossible, the Christian behaves valiantly. He dons his armor, the "helmet of salvation," and the "shield of faith," and gets ready for the encounter. He finds, to his joy, that for him horse and rider are not foes; they have come, the horseman as "God's sergeant," to invite and carry him to an eternal banquet.

In "Jethro's Justice of Peace," preached at a General Assizes, Ward takes advantage of the popular taste for caricature as he points out the defects in English government. He draws a convincing sketch of self-seeking politicians and then contrasts it with an idealized portrait of

the good magistrate. Although he minces no words in his criticism, he avoids antagonizing his audience by the often humorous detail of his "characters." The mercenary official is one who, quite uninvited, has "climbed into the chair of honour." But once there, he finds the perch precarious and sits in fear and trembling as "in the top of a mast." Far different is the situation of the good magistrate who has "come into his place by God's door, and not by the devil's window." He "sits on the judgment seat in as great though not so slavish a fear of offending as Olanes upon the flayed skin of his father Sylannes." Lest the gravity of the point Ward is making be lost in the witty device he employs to make it, he re-emphasizes his moral at the end of the sermon by a dignified emblem borrowed from Horace and the prophet Daniel: the statue of man with the head of gold and the feet of clay. This mixture of good and bad, he says, is the government of England.

The inventiveness of Ward's imagination is probably best demonstrated by his original figures of speech. In his Paul's Cross sermon, "Balm from Gilead," he relies almost entirely upon the power of bold metaphor, piling one on top the other in an attempt to persuade men of the value of a good conscience. Conscience is man's secret book, "written with the juice of oranges" and not legible until the fire of God's judgment at the last day shall make it so. It is no boarding-lodger cramped into a small corner of the soul, but a "judge" for the understanding, a "recorder and witness" for the memory, a "jailor and executioner" for the will. To the godly man it is a "Simon" to help him bear his cross,

the staff of age, *pabulum senile*, better than all the sack and sugars . . . When the stomach fails and the grinders wax few, and appetite ceaseth, this is a continual feast. In the decay of sleep, this is a down pillow (p. 108).

To the sinner it is a "Samson" asleep in the arms of a Delilah-like devil; but when, too late, it wakens,

you shall see the merry and jolly worldling hang the head like a bulrush, and the ruffian's brags lag like a starched ruff in a storm . . . The storm comes after the rain; that which is worst, an ill-conscience, like a bloodhound, hunts dry-foot, and brings the scent of sins of his youth (p. 108).

Ward's supply of images to portray conscience is seemingly un-

limited. He concludes his sermon by directing his exhortations not to his listeners but to conscience personified. Using a familiar, if inelegant, metaphor, he commissions conscience to act as the "cuds of the soul," that the admonitions of the preacher may be chewed over again when the sermon is done; to range abroad into the dens and stews of London; to enter courts of law and halls of nobles; to roar against the roaring boys; to comfort the afflicted.

In three of the nine sermons Ward allows a central image to indicate the pattern of development of the theme. Since he aims to exhort rather than to teach, he avoids in various ways the rigidity which the preferred formula of doctrines, reasons, and uses tends to create. Although he moves with subtle art from point to point, he usually makes a concession to his audience by outlining early in the sermon his major topics, derived mainly from the division of the text into its logical parts. He follows too the almost universal practice among the Puritans of ending his sermons with specific applications. But the variations he achieves in organization are surprising and often delightful. And probably the most intricate of these methods for gaining order and unity is his exploitation of a dominating image.

Stripped of its ornament, "A Coal from the Altar," treating the text "Be zealous," moves along the ordinary commonplaces of rhetoric. The subject, zeal, is defined and compared; its qualities are distinguished; and the manner of getting and keeping it is given. But Ward transforms his sermon by using the image of fire to provide the transitions from part to part and to amplify the ideas of each section.

Zeal is defined as a "celestial fire" sent to earth from heaven like the fire which kindled Elijah's sacrifice. It burns perpetually, a Vestal or altar fire within the heart, making the heart a "burning bush." Its warmth is contagious, as one coal kindles another; its flames leap over all impediments. It can be distinguished from its opposites—"hypocritical" zeal or "false fire"; "blind" zeal or "fool's fire"; and "turbulent" zeal or "wild fire"—because these "have no constant light or continued heat (like fixed stars)." They are but "meteors and vapours" having only "their aguish fits."

Although zeal is God's gift, it cannot be received or kept without effort. "Say not in thine heart, what Prometheus shall ascend into heaven and fetch it thence." Man must act for himself, aided by sermons which are "bellows" and by the Word which "cherishes and feeds the sparkles." To ignore these aids is to call down the anger of God,

who is Himself a consuming fire, destroying the wicked as he destroyed Sodom.

When Ward gets ready to make his application, he calls his message a "little round fire-ball . . . like David's stone," which he would toss into the "frozen" regions of paganism and into the very "tropics" of the church where men still remain "luke-warm." He sees the difficulty of the task, however; for, at the least flare of godly zeal, men come running with their buckets to extinguish it. Yet, he asserts confidently, God can make a pentecost in the soul and "baptize us with fire."

The twists given this image are ingenious. Ward has used myth and scripture as sources for his allegories supporting his description. He has drawn comparisons from nature and everyday life to clarify his points. By considering the properties of fire which make it both helpful and harmful, he makes his image suggest both good and evil, desire and fear, reward and punishment.

Even more complex is the imagery dominating "Woe to Drunkards." Here two images—the cup of wine and the poisonous serpent—both taken from the text in Proverbs, are arranged in a kind of counterpoint. Pronouncing doom upon drunkards, the text warns that whatever pleasures like in the cup, in the wine will bite like the serpent and sting like the adder. Ward proceeds to enlarge these pictures by wholesale borrowing from scripture, myth, and legend. The cup of wine, thought to be a cup of mirth, leaves the tang, contains the dregs, of disease. It is a "Circean" cup proffered by the devil, making men "brutes and swine." The examples given as proof of this are called a "taste" of God's indignation. But the cup is also the cup of the wrath of God, bringing the sinner into a hell already thirsting for him, its mouth wide open. The only remedy is Christ; he has "trod the winepress of his Father's fierceness" and has "drunk off a cup tempered with all the bitterness of God's wrath." He is the "water of life;" he offers wine in the sacrament to save the sinner, and his "*inebriamini* is, 'Be ye filled with the Spirit.'"

The connection between the cup and serpent images is achieved through the idea of poison. The three-fold death which intemperance produces—of grace, of the body, and of the soul—is the "three-forked sting" of the serpent, that "red dragon, Satan." The insatiable appetite for wine is the thirst produced by the serpent's bite, causing the victims to "swell till they burst withal and die." With a glance at the miracle

of St. Paul throwing the snake from his wrist, Ward declares that "one stung by this viper" shall "never shake it off." But further biblical allusion adds to the complexity of the image. Men who will not be warned are themselves serpents, "deaf adders;" those who tempt men to drunkenness are a "generation of vipers." Again, the antidote is Christ, the "brazen Serpent," and hope lies in the promise that the "Seed of the Woman shall bruise the head of the Serpent."

Weaving in and out, the two pictures join at last in the final appeal to the king to take action against this national vice:

'Take us these little foxes,' was wont to be the suit of the Church, for they gnabble our grapes, and hurt our tender branches; but it is become more serious. Take us these serpents, lest they destroy our vines, vinedressers, vineyards, and all (p. 159).

In the sermon "A Peace-Offering to God" a music image unites the parts of discourse. The choice is appropriate, for it supports the jubilant note of the sermon and, in its suggestion of harmony, compliments King James and Prince Charles, for whose safety the thanksgiving is made. Ward declares his role as preacher to be "but as the wheel to the bird, which, with its coarse noise sets better music on work." In developing the idea that thanks must be sincere, he uses a comparison:

The deeper and hollower the belly of the lute or viol is, the pleasanter is the sound; the fleeter, the more grating and harsh in our ears; the voice which is made in the mouth is nothing so sweet as that which comes from the depth of the breast (p. 137).

Without thankfulness, even if one could "descant with the voice of an angel, he were but as the sound of a tinkling cymbal" and his music but a sound of discord, a "black *Sanctis*."

No study of Ward's rhetoric can escape mentioning the large influence exerted by the scriptures. All of the Puritan preachers were aware of the psychological benefits of relying upon biblical phrase to give authority to sermon content. In Ward, this influence is so strong that many passages are mosaics of borrowed pictures and phrases neatly fitting together. One excerpt from the sermon "Christ is All in All" shows this extensive appropriation.

All let him be in all our joys, instead of all other contents unto us; good reason is it that he should fill our hearts that filieth all in all things. If he be ours, Apollos is ours, Cephas is ours, life and death, things present and to come, the world and all is ours; we Christ's and Christ God's. In him let our souls rest and re-

joice; I say again, rejoice always in him. If he be our shepherd, what can we want? If he be our host, shall not our table be furnished and cup overflow? If we err, is not he our way? If we doubt, is not he the truth? If we faint, is not he the life? (p. 8).

Ward here permits his basic text, from Colossians, to influence his first clause. This, given as a precept, is supported by phrases from the Epistle to the Romans. A second precept, this time from the Apocalypse, emerges as a consequent of the first, and is reinforced by a quotation from Philippians which introduces the climactic series of rhetorical questions. These, serving as reasons for the precept, are garnered from the Twenty-third Psalm and the Gospel according to John. Extensive as this borrowing is, it does not interfere at all with the stylistic unity of the passage or with Ward's happy plays on his key phrase, "all in all."

One can find hundreds of similar examples in the nine sermons; yet, as has already been indicated, Ward by no means limits himself to biblical sources. He draws from myth, ancient philosophy, the Church Fathers, classical poetry, jest-book anecdotes, and Ipswich case-histories to win his audience. In doing so, of course, he runs the risk of being censured for diluting the good wine with water. But he seems willing to take the chance in so good a cause. Perhaps, too, the fact that eight of the published sermons are "occasional"—meant for particular events and selected groups—explains their high strain of eloquence. The week-day lectures at St. Mary le Tower may well have been less ornamented.

Orator that he is, Ward sees the importance of variety in style. He does not attempt to keep his audience on a sustained lofty pitch, or to bore them by a steady, conversational tone. He uses, at strategic points, the high style of the rhetorical apostrophe and the swelling cadence of parallel and balanced clauses in series. At other times, he prefers the tight, near-staccato, sentence which has about it the prick of the epigram and contributes a tone of moral earnestness or of terse humor. He has no scruples about combining the heroic with the ordinary, the solemn exhortation with the witty aside.

As an artist, he shows independence in his practice of preaching. But, if the "evidence of the Spirit" lies in genuine concern to strike with the hammer of God on the conscience of the hardened sinner and to soothe the wounds of the repentant man, Ward fulfills the requirements of the Puritan pulpit. Ipswich townsmen nick-named him, in affection and respect, "Watch-Ward." The title must have pleased him.

A CASE FOR SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

By NOAH E. FEHL

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Professor Daniel Day Williams has suggested that the central issue disclosed in the recent inquiry into theological education in America is the question whether the task of the seminary be the training of ministers or the education of the Christian mind. I propose to explore this alternative with special reference to Anglican theological education. The issue can be formulated in several ways: should the task of the seminary be that of indoctrination in accord with the tradition and organization of the Anglican Church? Is the purpose of the Episcopal seminary to prepare men for canonical examinations or to prepare them for the ministry—to get them into the ministry or equip them for an effectual ministry? Should the center of the seminary curriculum be dogmatic or systematic theology?

The dogmatically oriented seminary relates the task of theological education directly to the external demands of the parish, the diocese, and the national church. Its thrust is "practical." In the theoretical fields it is implicitly dogmatic. Its interest in psychology, sociology, and education is in terms of their utility value as applied sciences. A student in this kind of seminary who approached the study of Christian theology and its relevance in the contemporary world with the same systematic concern and critical interest of a student in theoretical science might find limited aid and comfort but he would be in a manifestly alien environment. His questions about the internal relation of the doctrines of God, man, and nature to principles of education and the theories and techniques of psychology and sociology would be at best regarded as a special and peripheral personal interest. If he went further to ask about the relation of these doctrines to physics and biology there might even be a question of his vocation for the parish ministry.

In the "dogmatic-practical" type of seminary increasing tension develops between the theoretical and practical disciplines. The latter flourish and multiply like the green bay tree. Suddenly it is discovered that there are more hours in the practical field than in Bible, history,

and theology collectively. It comes as a great shock to the "content course" instructors that they are being crowded into an uncomfortably small corner. Such overcrowding may be a problem inherent in dogmatic theology itself; certainly it is inherent in the concept of the task of the seminary as the training of priests. Where the central concern is practical and dogmatic how can there be an internal integration of disciplines? Where the method and concern exclude the interpenetration of theology, philosophy, and the physical and social sciences, is there any alternative to barricaded departmental frontiers and the proliferation of practical courses essentially unrelated to the Faith. Theology itself may become another practical course: how to teach the creed, how to prepare for confirmation.

Where the task of the seminary is the education of the Christian mind the center of the curriculum is systematic theology. An interpenetration of disciplines will seek a structure of theoretical study internally relating biblical, historical, theological, and practical emphases. The tensions of the "systematic type" develop in account with basic issues of perspective and method reflecting the integrity of the historical, theological, and practical fields. There may be some tension as well between the aim of the seminary to educate the Christian man to minister to his contemporaries and the more immediate and specialized understanding of the needs of the Church on the positive level of parochial, diocesan, and national organization. The systematic type must serve the Church in terms of the representative mind. It must serve the Church also on the frontiers of research, discovery, and reconception.

This alternative is older than Theology itself, at least by the fact that the term was coined by Aristotle a generation after Plato had pondered the problem of the normative study of religion, first in the dialogue with Euthyphro and then again in the last years of his life in the monologue of the Tenth Book of the *Laws*.

Dogma like *theology* is a word that came into use in Hellenistic philosophy. It described the particular tenets of the several schools of the fourth century. So there were the dogmata of the Stoics, of the Epicureans, and of the Skeptics. These dogmata were published in little handbooks sometimes called doxographies, and distributed to the man-in-the-street disciples of the schools. Such minimal understanding was in contrast to the *Systema*, the curriculum of the school. Early in the patristic period the apologists spoke of the Christian dogmata.

It was the second century equivalent of the Kerygma. By the fourth century and with the rise of the conciliar formulae, *dogmata* became synonymous with *de fide* propositions designed to preclude heretical Christological notions.

Dogmatic theology today describes the doctrinal tradition of specific communions. Properly speaking, dogmatic theology is the explication of creeds and confessions such as those of Augsburg and Westminster. Where Dogmatics is the center of the seminary curriculum there are additional disciplines to fill out the theological field: prolegomena and epilegomena (the *Hilfswissenschaften* of the continental faculties) such as philosophical or natural theology, historical theology, history of religions, and apologetics.

Dogmatic theology in Anglicanism could be understood as the explication of the formulae of the Ecumenical Councils, the Thirty-nine Articles, the Prayer Book, together with selected synodical and conference pronouncements. Needless to say these do not cover all the essentials, let alone the whole range of Christian thought. Furthermore, in none of these are there clear or comprehensive statements. Some speak against distortions. Others intentionally generalize, trusting that greater good is served in inclusiveness than in clarity. Collectively they do not provide conceptually clear expression of the meaning of the events with which they deal.

Systematic theology differs from dogmatic in two significant respects. (1) It seeks to create a comprehensive and coherent explication of Christian thought. (2) Such a task demands a system, a perspective, a structuring motif which patterns the Faith into an ordered whole. Systematic theology is the explication, with a view toward fullest relevance, adequacy, and rationality of God's self-disclosure.

It is my reading of history that systematic theology is the appropriate expression of the ethos of Anglicanism. We are not a confessional church. We are not bound to a determinative dogmatic perspective which limits theological construction either because of a binding interpretation of tradition or a controlling emphasis upon a particular doctrine. The Anglican Church has avoided both the extremes of traditionalism and biblicism. Further, it has rejected the radical Protestant and Tridentine criticism of philosophy as the distortion of the Faith. On the other hand, it cannot be truly said that Plato is our Luther or Aristotle our Calvin.

Our neutralities may be and have been both riches and poverty.

They have been poverty where our lack of confessional concern has discouraged the rigorous theological effort reflective of the vitality of other communions. They have been poverty when we have short circuited our tensions by accepting now and then, here and there, packaged theologies. They have been poverty where we have been content with the fragmentary theology of conciliar formulae that were created primarily for the purpose of safeguards against particular distortions.

Our neutralities and our polar tensions have been riches where they have enabled us to look at alternatives with an equal eye and to regard wholeness and disciplined freedom as our special birthright. These riches have vaulted us into leadership in the Ecumenical Movement. They can also be the basis of leadership in theological construction.

The weapons of our warfare are not alone negative or neutral. We have also a positive tradition. There has emerged, beginning with the Fathers of the second century, a Christian perspective that has sought to relate positively and constructively the contributions of Athens and those of the Apostolic Mission that began in Jerusalem. This perspective is built upon several basic presuppositions that have, throughout the main currents of the Church's history, been regarded as the essential spiritual climate for the study of theology. This perspective is our heritage. It stands to remind us that while we serve one Master our understanding of Him has been enriched by two traditions: Judaism and Hellenism.

1. The first of these presuppositions is the center of our faith. It is the apostolic witness, the kernel of the "Christian Myth," the first article of all Christian Theology: "God was in Christ."

2. All truth is one. In God all the discoveries which in our human searching we have found—the many ways of our journeying and the sundry fields of our labors—are not merely broken fragments. They are all parts of one universe. Inquiry is by nature analytical. In science, as in empire, to divide is to conquer. The evil of this lies in the ever present pitfall of permitting "helpful distinctions to become hurtful divisions." The frontiers of all provinces of enquiry are not only adjacent. In our time we see that rigid boundaries simply do not exist. As Whitehead somewhere says, "we cannot divide the seamless robe of learning." Modern physics thrusts its students into theology. The task of the relevant presentation of the Christian Faith in our day thrusts the theologian into physics. When theology deals with the

question: what is Man? it cannot evade but must rather press the knowledge of the biologist and the social scientist. It is a question which cannot be answered with only the data of these disciplines, but neither is it a question which we can answer apart from the whole history of the human venture toward understanding. All truth is one ultimately for the Christian theologian because his commitment to God through Christ means reconciliation to all of life as a Divine encounter. For him there is no sphere that does not manifest God's wisdom, His righteousness, and His love.

3. Integrity as sincerity and wholeness means ultimately integration. Its root meaning is wholeness, soundness. For the Christian man there can be but one universe of discourse and meaning. On crucial issues he can never speak simply *qua* historian, or *qua* scientist, or *qua* philosopher, or *qua* Anglican. He must face such issues as a whole man. He must speak with unimpaired integrity. In religion as nowhere else full intellectual honesty is demanded of us. "Renouncing the hidden things of dishonesty" is the initial response to our calling from God "to come and reason together." The theologian's and the seminarist's life must be a continual reasoning with God. And in this converse we cannot offer less candour nor less boldness than is the reasonable service of the scientist and the philosopher. The world of the theologian is "one in which by violence or evasiveness, by want of the humility which learns and the patience which perseveres, we can miss our way."

4. The life of the theologian is marked by its pilgrim character. He is never fully at home with the settlers. As Professor Sidney Mead described it: the settlers "love the things the Pilgrim cannot take with him. . . . They have great barns in which to store the increase from their field. . . . The Pilgrim plucks the ears from the grain through which he walks. . . . They have security, the Pilgrim has faith and hope." There are elements of a true parallel between the trial of individuals and the test of communions in Bunyan's description of Pliable who after one bout with the Slough of Despond "got out on that side of the slough which was next to his own house . . . and Christian saw him no more."

Theologizing is a hazardous venture of faith. It means disenchantment sometimes. Probing destroys one kind of mystery. Turning the

¹John Oman, *Honest Religion*.

²S. Mead, "The Vocation of the Teacher," *Divinity School Bulletin, U. of Chicago*.

full light of honest dialectic upon beliefs demands faith. One has to trust in God. Faith affirms that which the light reveals, when all that moth and rust can corrupt has been removed, will not be tawdry, shabby, or cheap. Faith affirms that our apprehension of goodness will not turn out to have been a trick done with mirrors, or that the spiritual life can flourish nowhere but in the shelter of privilege.

5. The theological adventure demands discipline and freedom. It is characterized by disciplined imagination. In the seminary the discipline of the religious life must find expression in the study. To quote Professor Mead again; "The calling to teach is the calling to know something well. The teacher need not know everything, even everything pertaining to his own speciality, but he must know something thoroughly. And to know something thoroughly means to see it in the longest perspective and with all its implications."⁹ In the seminary as nowhere else there is need to cultivate the habit of un-biased thought.

6. The theologian must respond to the challenge of the "insistent present." Alfred Whitehead rightly counsels us: "The communion of saints is a great and inclusive assemblage but it has only one possible hall of meeting—the present." The present is holy ground. This is another way of illuminating the meaning of the vocation to teach and the call to the ministry. It is the hearing of the cry of the insistent present. This is above all else in learning and discipline what we must bring as our offering to the classroom. It is in part a knowledge of the temper of our time—the thrill of its great ventures, the exaltation of its visions, the immensity of its problems, the tragedy of "its strictures upon the tender working amidst its passions and violence of the spirit of God."¹⁰ The theologian must be appreciatively aware of the uniqueness of his own time, immersed in the tensions and struggles and joys of the existing crisis. He must feel the earth in travail as his contemporaries feel and live it. He must be concerned to discover and interpret the work of the hidden Christ within secular culture and to divine values and visions that languish within the non-Christian world both here and abroad, waiting to be recognized and made luminous.

These are the presuppositions of systematic theology understood as the explication of the Divine Self-disclosure in its fullest apprehendable breadth and depth.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰The phrase is from Bernard Meland, *Seeds of Redemption*.

II

Systematic theology has two foci. It begins with the assertion that God was in Christ. It is written from within the Christian community. It explicates the record of the experience of the community. Its first questions are given in the apostolic witness, in the Christian myth. They are given in the assertion that God was in Christ. This is an existential encounter and judgment. This is the essential assertion of the Christian Faith.

The Systematic theologian, no less than the dogmatic, starts with the personal confession: My future is Christ. "For me to live is Christ." He speaks also for his communion: our future is Christ. "Nothing shall separate us from the love of God which was in Christ Jesus our Lord." And he speaks for man: Man's future is Christ. "He is the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world . . . the world was made by Him. Without Him was not anything made that was made."

These assertions of faith lead to or explicitly urge another question. It, too, is an existential question. It arises out of the confrontation of our ultimate religious concern with our total experienced environment: How is Christ related to the ground of my being, the ground of my existence? Can he be my future if he is unrelated to my past? Can he be my destiny if he is unrelated to my nature? Everything physical and historical participates in the ontological structure of being. However and whatever the systematic theologian thinks about God, he must think about Him under these two aspects: (1) the aspect of Christ, and (2) the aspect of existence, of being.

This means that philosophy and theology are essentially and internally related. When the theologian talks about the Christian myth as something real he must answer the question about its relation to ontology. The God who was in Christ must be related to the ground of existence or else, like Marcion, you have two gods or you have a projection of valuation unrelated to reality.

You can talk about God as the mythologists talked about Zeus. You can talk about Him as *actus purus*, perfect being, i. e. as the construct of intellectual fulfillment. You can talk about Him as *ens per se existens*, i. e. as necessary being or as the counterpart of flux. You can talk about Him as essential being, i. e. as the counterpart of imperfection, corruption, brokenness. You can talk about Him as prime mover, i. e. as the ultimate postulate of causation. All of these

are in some sense ontological. Their relation to existence as understood by modern science is, however, in no sense apparent, and in general they are non-responsive, not relevantly descriptive. None is, of course, biblical. None is capable of bearing the richness or concreteness of the Living God who meets us in the Scriptures as He who was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.

Yet all of these have been essential elements in the historic formulations of Christian theology. All theology is structured by ontological perspectives either explicitly or implicitly. You cannot understand Athenagoras, Athanasius, Clement, Origen, Augustin, John Scotus, or Anselm unless you see their thought through Platonic eyes. You cannot understand the Scholastics apart from Aristotelian categories.

Both these systems (Platonic and Aristotelian) are oriented to a mythic cosmology of a two-storied universe from which their ontological concepts were derived. With the rise of modern science, Christian theology was threatened because it was seen to be inextricably and internally related to this mythic cosmology which had therefore to be defended against Copernicus and Galileo. The heteronomous church could not escape internecine conflict with autonomous science. In this that church was realistic. The Christian faith had the full force of its meaning against the background of mythic cosmology both in the Hellenistic and Medieval-Renaissance periods. Torn from its setting it was piteously irrelevant and tragically truncated.

Kant, responding to the insights of Duns Scotus, Occam, Luther, and Hume attempted the rehabilitation of the Christian Faith by the destruction of philosophy as the vital link between science and theology. His claim was to destroy reason to make room for faith. Christian theology after the Kantian 'ontolectomy' had not the force of either the Patristic or Medieval systems. Liberal Protestant theologies were structured by Kantianism. Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Hermann, Troeltsch, and Harnack were Kantians as also are Barth and Bultmann. All of these created value judgment systems in lieu of ontological systems. All these systems exhibit the tragic dichotomy of nature and history. Harnack's defense of Marcion is profoundly significant. All exhibit, despite their desperate earnestness and evangelical zeal a piteous irrelevance and a tragic truncation. They were prey to historical relativism because they could not deal with the ontological question. Bultmann's real problem today lies in the fact that he cannot or will

not relate the demythologized truth of the Scriptures to the scientific cosmology of the modern world.

Systematic theology in our day must take seriously the insight of Auguste Comte. His schema of the three ages (mythic, speculative, and scientific) contains a profound truth. We live in a *new Kairos*—the *Kairos of Science*, the kairos of scientific cosmology. Christian theology, dogmatic or otherwise, cannot now simply ignore this fact because it prefers mythic cosmology.

One cannot help but be impressed by the embarrassment of theologians today, whether they be orthodox, neo-orthodox, Thomist, or liberal, with the Christological problem. We can take the simple example of the credal phrase *came down from Heaven*. Very few of us are bold enough to take this in a simple spatial sense. The phrase, we say, expresses a truth symbolically. Precisely what the symbol is saying is, however, no more conceptually clear. If we mean anything more by it than a valuation of Jesus' life for which we feel justified in employing mythic cosmological imagery or poetic license, then we must relate Christ to the processes of creativity as we discursively and soberly understand them. Surely we must deal with the disparity of the symbol of kenosis as the explanation of the Christ event and the symbol of emergence by which we explain the appearance of life, of man, and of mind and spirit. For effective Christian apologetics the simple rejection of primitive science is not enough. It is not enough simply to say that we are not fundamentalists, that we do not in our Anglican seminaries attack the hypothesis of organic evolution in order to defend the Christian doctrines of nature, man, and God.

If we implicitly think now in evolutionary or emergent terms about man and about creativity, we cannot ignore them when we speak as theologians about man and about the acts of God. To be sure, theology in a very special sense must be in account with the symbols and the imagery through which the Faith has historically been transmitted. We must understand these symbols thoroughly, explore their nuances and connotations, attempt to recapture the force they had in the setting of Hellenistic philosophy and science. But we must also inquire to what extent as the vehicles of primitive science they convey Christian truth and to what extent they limit or distort the essentially Christian. And we must go further. We must go beyond Bultmann. We must with the humble daring of theology in the Patristic age

venture the interpenetration of science, philosophy, and the Christian Faith in this Kairos.

So long as we continue to exegete the Scriptures, to undertake the religious interpretation of history, and to explicate doctrine without explicit attention to what we understand God to be ontologically and what is the structure of His creativity, his working in nature and history and personality, we have evaded the demands of a theological education.

Until we relate principles of education, concepts of the nature and structure of personality, of the structure and dynamics of society to doctrines of nature, man, and God we shall contribute to the secularization of science and the irrelevance of theology.

When we dispose of the heart of the Christological problem with recourse simply to the terms of Hellenistic philosophy (*hypostasis*, *persona*, substance, essence, etc.) without asking first of all how valid is the cosmology and anthropology which they presuppose and how an eclectic Platonism and a speculative anthropology are to be related to contemporary physical and social science, we have indeed disposed of *the problem*. It has become irrelevant!

Systematic theology means a system. A system means a structuring motif. This motif must be expressive of the Christian Faith. It must also be related to modern science. The tension between these foci can only be the tension of internal relation. The Logos concept met both demands for the Hellenistic Age. It was the compelling idea of that philosophy and that science, the persuasive generalization of that mythic two-storied universe. It is now only a symbol and one that is neither clear nor luminous. We cannot even be sure what John precisely meant by it.

Process is the metaphysical generalization based upon modern science. It seeks in account with nuclear physics, biology, and the social sciences to describe creativity and its structure. We cannot talk meaningfully about God as Creator today without reference to what creativity is in scientific theory. Systematic theology cannot ignore process philosophy.

There are two further elements to the urgency of a systematic theology today. For the next several decades our nation will probably support a crash program for the training of scientists and technicians. Already we can discern signs of a campaign to raise the prestige of the profession and to enhance the place of physical science in the curriculum of the schools. The clergy, especially in this period, should be

prepared both to relate the Gospel to an increasingly articulate scientific culture and to interpret objectively to the culture its new dedication to education and achievement in science. For our seminaries to ignore this aspect of the insistent present may mean that we will ourselves contribute to a further secularization of education and a new yield of materialism in our culture.

The second element of urgency is to be found in the lesson we may learn from the present plight of religions in Eastern countries. Their inability or failure to reorganize the structure and dynamics of their respective cultures under the impact of Western science has forced Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam in so many instances either into a religion of the state or into the path of limbo. It is not inconceivable that the pace of science and the peripheral concerns of theological and ecclesiastical leadership could conjoin to create a culture and a church against which the gates of hell *would* prevail.

III

The implications of these perspectives of the history of theology and the contemporary theological situation appear to me to be inescapable. They point to a systematic theology, to the education of the Christian man as the one truly live option of method and organization in theological education.

A theological education is a product of a community of inquiry. Theology is internally related to Bible, Church History, Ethics, Religious Education, and Pastoral Care. A new break-through in any of these fields crosses the frontiers of the others. Could any alert student listen to a discussion of Bultmann in a New Testament course and not be aware of its implications not only for theology but also for church history and ethics?

Competence in seminary teaching extends beyond the limits of one's own specialty. No faculty can expect the breadth and integration of a theological education in its students unless it is itself a community of inquiry. A professor in any one discipline has not only the obligation competently to communicate knowledge to his students but also to meet his colleagues on their own ground, hearing them and asking them questions.

Systematic theology is an enterprise of the whole faculty. Its tensions are those of the other disciplines as well, and theirs are those of the theologian.

Biblical study deals with revelatory events, yet it must deal with the record of them with the tools of all historical and literary disciplines. Its primary documents are the Scriptures which within the Christian community will ever be approached as sacred, yet it must deal with them with the unqualified integrity of the historian and the literary critic. It deals with material that is mythic, set within a particular cultural horizon, expressed in the idiom of an historic concept of the character of importance. It must deal with this material so as to release its word to be spoken to us. It cannot simply modernize so that we speak only to ourselves. It must be dynamically involved in the reconstruction of a cosmological and ontological background giving depth and perspective to biblical truth.

Research, interpretation, and communication in church history is similarly fraught with inescapable internal tensions. It has only the tools of historical methodology with which to work, and it can see the past only through the eyes of the present. It deals with an institution inextricably set at every moment in a context of culture, internally related in each age to the spirit and powers of that age, yet living from age to age an inner life of its own. History deals with change. It cannot reduce the dynamic to the static nor the unique to the universal. It cannot ignore either continuity or discontinuity, evolution or revolution. Yet it must render clear, in Whitehead's phrase, "some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact." It must discuss history against the background of a philosophy of event. No history can ultimately ignore the ontological question. Church history presupposes that the interpreter of its crucial events shall speak only after that encounter.

Practical theology as ethics, as religious education, as sociology and psychology of religion, unless it gathers where it has not sown, bears the fullest burden of the education of the Christian mind. It deals with theories and techniques, analyses, and critiques having their origin outside the field of theology and in many instances in schools hostile to institutional religious expression. Here in the practical field Christology has its sharpest focus; for what it means to be a new creature, what it means to live under grace and judgment, what sin is and what are the processes of integration, salvation, and redemption, have here necessarily to be related to dynamic structures of personality and society as disclosed by psychology and sociology. The practical field must express the Christian Faith in action through processes that

are also the object of scientific inquiry. To the extent to which the practical field participates both in the tensions of the social sciences and the theological endeavor, the power of the Christian Faith is disclosed as a vital thrust into human life and into the culture. To the extent that the practical field is non-responsive either to the social sciences or to systematic theology, there is exhibited the bankruptcy of an irrelevant religion bearing the name Christian.

For teacher and for student the theological seminary must be a tension producing experience. It is quite literally a living under grace and judgment. Anything less is sectarian. And we know that this is so, as we know that our faith is not in the Bible, nor is it in the creeds, nor is it in the church. Our faith is in God. To be theologians, both as teachers and as students, is to walk by faith in the living God and to pray without ceasing.

THE THEOLOGY OF VLADIMIR LOSSKY

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One of the most interesting and provocative of modern Russian theologians was Vladimir Lossky, who died in Paris on February 7, 1958. Lossky was a layman, and he wrote only one book, *Essai sur la Théologie Mystique de l'Église d'Orient*, published in Paris in 1944. But this book was the fruit of a lifetime's labor, and it represents the mature and considered views of one who had participated deeply in the interior life of the Orthodox Church. In addition to this single monumental work, Lossky wrote some articles, the most recent of which, "The Theology of the Image," was published in English in the journal *Sobornost* just before Lossky's death. Quantitatively small, the work of this extraordinary man may in time well come to be considered qualitatively very great.

"Vladimir Lossky was the son of the famous Russian philosopher Nicolai Lossky. Born in 1904 in St. Petersburg, he received his education first in Russia, then after the 1917 Revolution, in Prague and in Paris. It was in Paris that he spent almost all his life, teaching,

writing, maintaining close contacts with the theological and intellectual circles of Western Europe."¹ In many respects, Lossky represents the theologian *par excellence*; not only was he superbly dedicated to his field, but, equally important, he was also a devout son of the Church and he viewed Christian truth from within the sphere of grace.

The title of Lossky's major work is possibly a bit misleading. The theme of the *Essai sur la Théologie Mystique* is not so much mystical theology in the ordinary sense as dogmatic theology in its relation to the life of the soul in grace. The great doctrines, particularly the doctrine of the Trinity, are the central theme of this work. Furthermore, it should be noted that Lossky writes from a specifically Eastern Orthodox point of view, and here the word *Eastern* should not be underestimated. But the word must not be construed in merely geographical terms, but rather as a distinct type of ecclesiastical tradition, embodying, indeed, traditions that once were universal; and which even now is geographically diffused, and finds expression within nations and cultures which are in no wise Eastern. "Moreover, *eastern* can mean so many things: from the cultural point of view the East is less homogeneous than the West. What have Hellenism and Russian culture in common, notwithstanding the Byzantine origins of Christianity in Russia? Orthodoxy has been the leaven in too many different cultures to be itself considered a cultural form of eastern Christianity. The forms are different: the faith is one."² Yet in spite of these protestations of the universal character of Orthodoxy (not without some truth, at least on the dogmatic side), the fact remains that Lossky leans heavily on the Greek Fathers, especially the pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory Palamas. Other ecclesiastical traditions, such as Anglicanism, have also leaned upon the Greek Fathers; but Lossky's Eastern Orthodoxy differs in temperament and spirit from the prevailing systems of theology in the West.

This appears in his theological methodology, in which he follows the apophatic way of the pseudo-Dionysius. Cataphatic or positive theology uses the method of affirmation; apophatic or negative theology uses the method of negation. Much of the trinitarian and Christological doctrine of the great ecumenical councils was reached by means of negation and was stated apophatically. Positive or cataphatic theology "leads us to some knowledge of God, but is an imperfect way. The

¹*St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly*, II, 2, p. 47.

²Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, p. 17.

perfect way, the only way which is fitting in regard to God, who is of His very nature unknowable, is the second—which leads us finally to total ignorance. All knowledge has as its object that which is. Now God is beyond all that exists. In order to approach Him it is necessary to deny all that is inferior to Him, that is to say, all that which is. If in seeing God one can know what one sees, then one has not seen God in Himself but something intelligible, something which is inferior to Him. It is by *unknowing* (*agnôsia*) that one may know Him who is above every possible object of knowledge."³ Is it not that there must be some organic connection between this apophatic method in theology and the fact that monasticism is the archetype of Eastern Orthodox piety?

As might be expected, Lossky stresses the absolute transcendence of God and His unknowability in His essence. No Western neo-Reformation theologian exceeds Lossky on this point. "Ho who . . . imagines at a given moment that he has known what God is has a depraved spirit, according to St. Gregory Nazianzen."⁴ As a man progresses in the spiritual life, as he rises from meaner to better ideas of God, by perception of what God is not, he must be ever increasingly on guard lest he make even these refined concepts stopping-places, thus making them idols. Here, at the very deepest and most indispensable level of the religious category, we have that profound sense of mystery which permeates all Orthodoxy.

The role of cataphatic theology in the knowledge of God is to be the "theology of the Divine Names," to be a "series of theophanies," the supreme theophany being, of course, Christ. But even in Christ, in the Word made flesh, we do not "possess" God, we do not define, delineate or domesticate Him. The mysteries inherent in Christology warn us not to say too much: they are evidence that only apophatically can we know the mystery of the supreme Godmanhood.

It will be evident from all this that Lossky's system (and he claims that all Eastern Orthodoxy is on his side here) has nothing to do with rationalism or any kind of facile, easy-going philosophical theology. For him Origen is only a religious philosopher, for Origen knew too much. It is characteristic of the philosopher to speak when the theologian would keep silent.

Yet, "unknowability does not mean agnosticism or refusal to know

³*Op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 39.

God. Nevertheless, this knowledge will be attained only in the way which leads not to knowledge but to union.⁸⁵ That God is incomprehensible in the strict sense of the word has been the teaching of Christian tradition both East and West; whether God is unknowable in the strict sense of the word depends upon what the strict sense of the word really is. The Apostle Paul says: "Now I know in part; but then shall I know fully even as also I was fully known."⁸⁶ Simple perceptive cognition obviously does not apply to God, and in this sense God is absolutely unknowable. But if faith is a form of perception—on another level and in another dimension—then God can be known by faith, although He cannot be comprehended even by faith. Faith is, of course, union with God. And faith leads, according to Holy Scripture, not to the Divine Darkness but to the Divine Light.

Lossky is characteristically Eastern in his distinction between the essence of God and what he calls the "uncreated energies" of God. While God remains unknowable in His essence, He is known in His energies. The uncreated energies are distinguished from the three Divine Hypostases; yet God is not composite. "One may say, to use a common expression, that the energies are attributes of God; provided, that is, that one remembers that these dynamic and concrete attributes have nothing in common with the concept-attributes with which God is credited in the abstract and sterile theology of the manuals. The energies manifest the innumerable names of God, according to the teaching of the Areopagite: Wisdom, Life, Power, Justice, Love, Being, God. . . ."⁸⁷ It is interesting to note that Lossky escapes the speculative sophiology of other Russian theologians: "The attribute of Wisdom, common to the Trinity, designates the Son in the order of the divine economy; thus: 'the Son is the hypostatic Wisdom of the Father'."⁸⁸ This identification of the Divine Wisdom with Christ accords with the spirit of St. Paul in I Cor. 1:30, "Christ Jesus, who was made unto us Wisdom from God."

Like Solovyov, Lossky connects religious knowledge with the doctrine of the Trinity. This he connects with the "theology of the image." The Son is the image of the Father, the Logos a "definition" of the Father; so the Holy Spirit is the image and revealer of the Son. By and in the Holy Spirit we know Christ, and in knowing the Son we

⁸⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁸⁶I Cor. 13:12.

⁸⁷Lossky, *Essai sur la Théologie*, p. 80.

⁸⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 83.

know the Father. here is thus a symphonic character in revelation, in which the Undivided Trinity is active.

The whole concept of image (*eikôn*) is important for Lossky, and in this too he shows the Eastern Orthodox character of his thought. Speaking of man he says: "his creation in the image and likeness of God implies the idea of participation in the divine Being, of communion with God. That is to say, it presupposes grace. The image of God in man, in so far as it is perfect, is necessarily unknowable."⁹ The reference is not only to the mystery of human personality but more especially to the divine image and likeness to be restored as a result of spiritual union with God. St. Paul touches upon the same point: "And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly."¹⁰ "We may say that for a theologian of the catholic tradition in the east as in the west, for one who is true to the main lines of patristic thought, the theme of the image (in its twofold acceptation—the image as the principle of God's self-manifestation and the image as the foundation of a particular relationship of man to God) must belong to the 'essence of Christianity'."¹¹ In his theology of the image, Lossky differs sharply from such theologians as Karl Barth and Anders Nygren. But, says he, the God of Israel forbids images and condemns the curiosity of those who would inquire into His transcendent nature, because in revelation the initiative must belong to Him alone. "He hides the depths of His being until the decisive moment, only making Himself known to His elect by His authority."¹² Theology in the modern sense therefore becomes possible only after the Incarnation. It is in the Son, whom St. Paul calls "the image of the invisible God" (*eikôn tou theou tou aoratoru*),¹³ that we have revelation, the Logos, the Divine Wisdom, theology. Apart from the Image of the invisible God we shall not have that image which is redeemed humanity, nor shall we have that image which is Holy Scripture, nor that image which is the Church. "The trinitarian theology of 'images' can only have its place in a verticle perspective, that of the (self)-revealing action of the divine nature to which the old patristic formula corresponds: 'of the Father, by the Son, in the Holy Ghost.'"¹⁴

⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁰I Cor. 15:49.

¹¹Lossky, "The Theology of the Image," *Sorbornost* 3, 22, p. 510.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 515.

¹³Col. 1:15.

¹⁴Lossky, *The Theology of the Image*, p. 517.

The destiny of God's people and the consummation of the aeon consist in the restoration of the fulness of the divine image in man, in the "deification" of man, that is to say in man's joyous reunion and communion with God, that God may be all in all.

Russian theology has always been highly eschatological, often apocalyptic, and Lossky remains substantially true to this tradition. The transfiguration of the cosmos, no less, is the end and crown of history. The fullness of the Holy Spirit will usher us to the Feast of the Kingdom. "The consciousness of the fullness of the Holy Spirit, given to each member of the Church in that measure to which he has attained, banishes the shades of death, the terrors of the Judgment and the abyss of Hell, in turning our attention solely to the Lord coming in His glory. This joy in the resurrection and the life everlasting makes of the paschal night 'a banquet of faith', wherein all may participate—though but feebly and for a few moments—in the fullness of that 'eighth day' which shall have no end."¹⁸

THE HINDU DOCTRINE OF THE ATMAN

By N. Lossky

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In the Hindu systems of philosophy and in religions connected therewith it is generally taught that individual human souls are lower selves, at the basis of which lies a higher self, identical in them all—Atman, and that this Atman is God, Brahma. The conception of Atman is worked out differently in the different philosophical systems. Not being a specialist on the history of Indian philosophy and religion, I confine myself in the present article to the teaching of Swami Vivekananda, expounded in the anthology *The Yogas and other works*¹ which contains a selection of his lectures and articles and also his detailed biography (pp. 1-179).

Vivekananda was born in 1863 and died in 1902; he came of a cul-

¹⁸Lossky, *Essai sur la Théologie*, p. 247. The reference is to the Orthodox Easter Midnight Service as a type of the Feast of the Kingdom.

¹The anthology (published in New York, 1953) is compiled by Swami Nikhilananda. ("Swami" means a monk professing a religion based upon the Vedanta philosophy.)

tured family and received a good education at home and in two colleges at Calcutta. Well versed in the Indian cultural tradition he also acquired a perfect knowledge of the philosophy, literature and general culture of Europe. His chief instructor in the religious life was Swami Ramakrishna (1836-1886) whom Vedantists regard as an incarnation of God.

After becoming a religious teacher Vivekananda travelled on foot all over India, successfully preaching religious truths. His admirers collected funds to enable him to go to Chicago, where in 1893 representatives of different religions met for a Congress. He had excellent knowledge of English and read several papers on Hinduism at the Congress. The Lectures Bureau arranged for him to visit many towns in the United States, and by his lectures and the influence of his wonderful personality Vivekananda attracted many Americans and Europeans to his religion. From America he went to Europe and lectured in London, returning to India in January, 1897. In 1899 Vivekananda went to Europe and the U. S. A. once more and came back to India at the end of 1900. He died in 1902 of overwork, but chiefly because he wanted to die, believing that he had accomplished his earthly mission. Accounts of Vivekananda's life and activity give grounds for thinking that he was a saintly character.

Vivekananda's lectures are mainly concerned with describing the four kinds of Yoga—Jnana-yoga, Bhakti-yoga, Karma-yoga, Raja-yoga. All these four kinds of Yoga deal with the different methods of ascent of the individual soul to the Oversoul, to God. In speaking about these religious practices, Vivekananda expounds his religious philosophy. Religion, he says, springs from man's desire to transcend the limitations of the world of sense and to rise to the super-sensuous, the super-rational, the Infinite, the Absolute. The goal is reached through renouncing selfishness and developing spirituality (pp. 202-206). The world of the senses, in which we live, is *maya* and not real being; it is "a mixture of existence and non-existence;" "everything in it is mortal" (p. 221), "everything is limited by time, space and causation" (p. 212). The good in it is indissolubly bound up with evil (pp. 227, 622).

Matter is not a substance, but only a process of motion (p. 211), a manifestation of force, the source of which is the Soul, designated in Sanskrit by the term Atman. Time, space and causation do not form part of the nature of Atman. Atman is higher than mind, since mind is bound up with time. Atman "has neither form nor shape," hence

it is infinite and omnipresent. "The infinite cannot be two. If the soul be infinite, there can be only one Soul, and all ideas of various souls—of your having one soul, and I having another, and so forth—are not real. The Real Man, therefore, is one and infinite, the omnipresent Spirit. And the apparent man is only a limitation of that Real Man." "The Real Man, the Spirit, being beyond cause and effect, not bound by time and space, must therefore be free." Man as an appearance is limited and, consequently, bound by time, space and causation. Some philosophers say, however, that he only appears to be bound, but is not so in reality, because at the basis of our souls lies the infinite and omnipresent spiritual nature (p. 212).

The teaching about the Absolute or God may be dualistic or monistic (non-dualism). The dualists believe in a personal God outside the world; He has favorites who will be saved, while others will not. Adherents of various dualistic religions think that God favours their particular religion alone, and are hostile to other religions. This gives rise to religious persecutions and wars (p. 251).

Vivekananda is an adherent of the philosophy of monism as expressed in the religious teachings of the Advaita, a branch of the Vedanta (p. 314). As already said, according to the monistic view, at the basis of the lower individual souls lies the universal Spirit, Atman, identical in them all. Atman, in its turn, is identical with the Absolute itself, the god Brahma. God is the Impersonal Absolute (p. 236) with the following three attributes: infinite existence, infinite knowledge and infinite bliss. These attributes constitute one single whole—Love (p. 251 f.).

God is at the basis not only of human souls, but of all the world. God is "our own real Self" (p. 243). We seek God in temples, on the earth or in heaven, while he is within us, "He is our own Self" (p. 214). The world as a whole "is God Himself" (p. 313). "Men are taught from childhood that they are weak and sinners" (p. 217), but it is better, instead, to concentrate on the idea which gives strength: "I am He" (p. 218).

The Absolute or God is perfect being, and the world is *maya*, unreal being. In the world, there can be no good without evil, or evil without good (pp. 622, 227). The question arises, then, how does *maya*, i. e. a world full of imperfections, come to be? Vivekananda's answer is that "the Absolute has become the universe by coming through time, space and causation" (p. 244). "The question as to why the Infinite became the finite is absurd, for it is self-contradictory": in reflecting

about the cause of this, we subordinate the Absolute to causation, which is impossible (p. 245). "What we call causation begins after, if we may be permitted to say so, the degeneration of the Absolute into the phenomenal" (p. 244). The question how the Infinite and the Absolute has become finite "will always remain unanswered" because the Absolute "is always the Unknowable One" (p. 245).

Vivekananda seldom says that the Absolute is the Creator of the world; he rejects the Christian doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing. He quotes the Vedar as follows: "As the spider spins the thread out of its own body . . . even so the whole universe has come out of that Being." "Thus God is the material cause of the universe" (p. 313). The universe is "a peculiar form of the Absolute" (p. 247).

All the world's entities are "manifestations" of the Absolute. The Atman is present in saints and sinners, in men and beasts, but is expressed in them in a different degree. In every joy which we experience, we participate in the Absolute Bliss. "Even the joy of the thief in stealing, it is that Absolute Bliss; only it is obscured with all sorts of extraneous conditions, and misunderstood" (p. 266). Everything in the world, "birth and death, life and decay, degeneration and regeneration, are all manifestations of that Oneness"; the difference is only in the degree of manifestation (p. 282). "We see love everywhere in nature. Whatever in society is good and great and sublime is the working out of that love; whatever in society is very bad, nay, diabolical, is also the ill-directed working out of the same emotion of love" (p. 434). "The Vedanta recognizes no sin; it recognizes only error." A man who thinks that he is weak, a sinner, a miserable creature incapable of doing anything, merely adds a new link to the chain which holds him down. It is clear, therefore, that "not pleasure but knowledge is the goal of man" (p. 457).

"All things are rushing towards their goal, and it is only a question of time when you and I, plants and animals, and every particle of life that exists, must reach the infinite Ocean of Perfection, must attain to Freedom, to God" (p. 227). As a rule this goal is attained by means of a series of reincarnations. The behavior of every creature is its Karma, upon which the nature of its next incarnation depends. "A tremendous potential power is trying to express itself" and struggling against the environment which hinders it. In doing so, it takes new bodies again and again: "an amoeba, in the struggle, gets another body

and conquers some obstacles, then gets another body, and so on until it becomes man" (p. 248).

Right conduct, leading to a more and more perfect expression of the Infinite Subject, God, who is our true nature, consists in doing good to others, in overcoming evil by love, in manifesting love for human beings and animals. The essence of morality is self-abnegation, liberation from egoism. The stimulus for such conduct is "sympathy, the feeling of sameness everywhere" (p. 215). And indeed, since the true nature of all beings is an Impersonal God, it may be said of every creature "Thou art that" (*Tat tvam asi*). "Manifoldness is only apparent" (pp. 280, 308). Hence, murder or injury is an evil which I perpetrate on myself (p. 317). The great idea of the oneness of all beings leads to Universal Love (p. 346). The help I receive in all my troubles and misfortunes comes from Atman, from God who is within me; "I am to worship, therefore, none but my Self" (p. 316).

The four kinds of Yoga described by Vivekananda contain valuable suggestions about the practical methods of becoming a perfect expression of the Absolute. He particularly insists on the necessity of cultivating in oneself 'non-attachment' to anything earthly (Bhakti-yoga, pp. 428-454). Brahman is the source of our existence, and "to reach back to Brahman is our goal." A man who overcomes all desires "will become God" while still on earth (pp. 317, 277, 623); such for instance was Ramakrishna.

A yogi who has reached a high degree of perfection acquires boundless power, "except that he cannot create a world." "He may enter a dead body and make it get up and move." "He does not sink in water, he can walk on thorns and sword blades and stand in fire, and can depart from this life whenever he likes." He acquires supernatural hearing and "hears anything he wants to." He can go anywhere through the air. "He can make himself as minute as an atom or as huge as a mountain, as heavy as the earth or as light as air, he can rule everything he wants" (pp. 674-676). But there is something higher than all these attainments: the final goal is to free oneself from one's personality and be dissolved in the Impersonal Absolute, as a drop of water in the ocean. It is in this that the deification of the world consists (p. 254).

Vivekananda's religious philosophy is a form of pantheism. He does not agree with this: according to him, pantheism is the doctrine according to which the world is God, while in his teaching God or the

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Impersonal Absolute transcends the world. Vivekananda arbitrarily limits the meaning of the term "pantheism" applying it only to the crude forms of the doctrine. In the more refined forms of it God is conceived as the Absolute which transcends the world, but the world is regarded as Its manifestation. This is the view of the neoplatonic school founded by Plotinus, of Spinoza, Hegel, Edward Hartmann and others.

Vivekananda says that the lofty doctrine of Advaita is not the religion of the masses in India; "the vast mass of Indian people are dualists" (p. 310). Apparently, however, monism has many adherents. The Advaitists, headed by Vivekananda, founded the Ramakrishna Mission Association with two sections, one in India and another outside it (p. 126). In the United States of America there is a Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Centre in New York, and in South California there is a section of the Ramakrishna Association at Los Angeles and Santa Barbara. Some well-known English and American writers belong to this Association.

Vivekananda maintains that all religions strive after the same goal: "they are not contradictory; they are supplementary" (p. 381). "Whether one is Christian, or Jew, or Hindu, it does not matter. Are you unselfish? That is the question" (p. 494). The philosophies, mythologies and rites are different, but there is "unity in variety." "God is the centre of all religions," and "each of us is moving towards Him" (p. 392).²

The purpose of the present article is to show that Vivekananda's pantheism is logically untenable and cannot be accepted by Christians. Nevertheless his philosophy contains many lofty ideas and rules of conduct which coincide with the Christian teaching. I will mention the chief of them.

God is absolute perfection and all-embracing love. The idea of the God-man is to be found in Vivekananda's religion, but is essentially different from the Christian conception. According to the Christian teaching Jesus Christ is the only God-man, but according to Vivekananda many persons come under that definition—not only Jesus Christ, but also Buddha, Krishna, Ramakrishna and others. The idea that all shall be saved and that no one is doomed to the torments of hell lasting for an infinite time has been propounded by Christian thinkers, for instance by St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Maximus the

²The lecture on "The ideal of a Universal Religion" (pp. 387-399).

Confessor. At the present time in the Russian philosophy it is upheld by Fr. Sergius Bulgakov, Berdyaev, N. Lossky, and others.

Vivekananda's ethics abound in lofty ideas. Such for instance are his arguments about the necessity of cultivating all-embracing love and freeing oneself from egoism. Every Christian monk, as well as many laymen, recognizes that non-attachment to earthly goods is a necessary condition for advancing towards the Kingdom of God. The attitude of mutual hostility between Christian denominations, deprecated by Vivekananda, is being gradually overcome in our day, thanks to the Ecumenical Movement. The idea that reincarnation is a condition of growing in perfection is found in some Christian thinkers and is expressed, for instance, by Leibniz, and in our time by Berdyaev and N. Lossky.

Vivekananda says that God, the Absolute, is unknowable, meaning by this that not a single idea derived from our knowledge of the cosmos is applicable to God. Christians hold the same view, worked out systematically in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite; it is called negative theology. No determination can be predicated of God: He transcends all determinations.

It is essential to distinguish between negations which lead downwards and impoverish the subject, and negations which lead upwards to the realm of the Transcendent. Accordingly, when in negative theology we say that God is not a person, is not an existent etc., we thereby affirm that God is above personality, above existence and so on. The impossibility of expressing God in earthly terms does not mean that He is unknowable; on the contrary, the system of such negations gives us exact knowledge about Him. Such knowledge is confirmed by the religious experience of "meeting" God as Something incomparable with the world. Rudolf Otto in his book *Das Heilige* says that in that experience one is conscious of meeting *das ganz Andere*—"the utterly different" from everything in this world.

In the Christian doctrine negative theology is supplemented by positive, according to which God is Personal, is Spirit, is Love and so on. There is no contradiction between negative and positive theology: when expressing the nature of God in positive terms, we ascribe to the Super-personal, Super-spiritual God all that is of value in the conceptions of Personality, Spirit, Love. This valuable content is present in God in such a superlative degree that the positive terms are used merely by way of analogy with their earthly meaning. Thus, for in-

stance, according to the Trinitarian dogma, God, being One in essence, is in Three Persons—God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost. This clearly shows that the word Person is used in theology simply by way of analogy—not of a *logical*, but of a *metalogical* analogy. Analogy used in logical inferences always contains an identical element present in two analogous subjects, but theological analogy does not imply that there is an element of identity between the human and the Divine personality. Thus there is nothing anthropomorphic in the Christian teaching about God as held by Christians with any knowledge of theology.

The Christian teaching concerning the relation between God and the world is dualistic: God creates the world as a reality different from, and not contained in Him. The words "God created the world out of nothing" express a thought which is very simple but grammatically badly expressed. They do not mean that God took "nothing" as a material out of which He made the world. Christians do not profess anything so absurd. What is meant is that God does not need any material out of which to create the world—whether that material be given to Him from outside or taken from within His own Self, as Vivekananda supposes. He has absolute creative power and creates the world as something completely new both in form and content. His creativeness is different from ours which always needs material given from outside (marble, pigments etc.) or borrowed from our own past experience. But even human activity in so far as it contains, to however small a degree, an element of novelty, implies creation out of nothing, so that this conception is indispensable for understanding the world.

Vivekananda's notion of the creation of the world by Brahma is different: he thinks that the world is a "manifestation" of the Absolute which takes the material out of Itself, after the fashion of a spider weaving its web. The world arising therefrom is so imperfect that in it the good is inevitably bound up with evil. It is not surprising that he calls such creation a kind of "degeneration" of the Absolute (p. 244) and gives no answer to the question why it takes place; he thinks that the question is self-contradictory and implies that the Absolute is subject to time. In truth, however, creation means that the world has its supertemporal ground in God who creates both the world and the time in it.

According to Vivekananda the individual human soul is a lower

self at the basis of which lies the Higher Self, Atman, i.e. God, identical in all beings. A particular human self is "merely a limitation of this Real Man" (p. 212). Hence it follows that human individuality consists merely in the addition to the Atman of events and qualities such as "born in a certain place and at a certain time, educated at this or that college; brave or cowardly" and so on. Thus, strictly speaking, a man's life is the result not of his own but of the Atman's activity. In order to create events of which our life consists, it is necessary to possess creative power, and such power can only be inherent in a super-temporal being and not in events or qualities expressible in general notions. According to Vivekananda, however, a man's individual self is not an immortal and supertemporal being; only Atman, who through limiting Himself gives rise to our individuality, is such a being. Hence, strictly speaking, our actions are produced by Atman who is identical with God, or Brahma.

This explains Vivekananda's pantheistic assertions. Not only the good, but the evil and the diabolical are expressions of one and the same love (p. 434); even a thief's joy is "Absolute Bliss," though wrongly understood (p. 266). If my life is a manifestation of Atman, it follows that my religious worship should be directed upon myself (p. 316). This idea inspires men like Vivekananda who was pure in heart with active, joyous and confident love for all creatures, but for many it may be a source of proud conceit, detrimental to moral life.

According to the Advaita religion expounded by Vivekananda the purpose of every individual human soul is to get rid of one's individuality and return to Atman, i.e. to God or the Impersonal Absolute. Thus, God—the Absolute Perfection—creates a world full of imperfections, in which the good is inevitably bound up with evil, and the purpose of creation is that the world's entities should disappear and dissolve in the Absolute. The meaning of such creation is unintelligible: God creates a bad world, and the purpose of all the creatures in it is to cease existing.

According to the Christian philosophy, the creation of the world has a lofty meaning. The omniscient, omnipotent and all-merciful God is absolute perfection, and His purpose in creating the world is to increase to the utmost the domain of the perfect good. Hence, God creates persons endowed with properties necessary for the realization of the perfect good. Each person is a supertemporal and therefore immortal and superspatial self, possessing creative power and free will.

Freedom of will is a necessary condition for creating the absolute good which is realized by those who love God more than themselves and other beings as much as themselves, and consequently are completely free from egoism. Such persons form the Divine Kingdom. Their bodies are not material but *transfigured*, and are made of light, sound, fragrance; they perform no acts of repulsion and are therefore able to penetrate through all material obstacles. They are free from all physiological processes. All their life consists in creating and assimilating the absolute values of truth, goodness and beauty. There are no failings or imperfections in the Kingdom of God. Its members are in immediate and living communion with God and their life is full of bliss.

Freedom of will is a precious but fateful gift. It may be misused. Absolute goodness is realized only by such persons who in their love observe the true scale of values, that is, who love God more than themselves and love all persons created by Him as themselves. But there are persons who in striving for the perfect fulness of life are indifferent to the majority of other persons and care primarily about themselves, i.e. enter the path of egoism. Such persons form our realm of being which is full of imperfections. Their bodies are formed by acts of repulsion intended to preserve solely for themselves a certain portion of space and, in consequence, are material bodies. Instead of the fulness of life, egoistical beings create an impoverished existence, full of striving for relative values which are good in some respects and bad in others. Hence there arises a struggle for existence, often accompanied by hostility and even hatred between the warring entities. It may be asked how could an omniscient, omnipotent and all-merciful God have created persons about whom He foresaw that they would be selfish and give rise to our realm of being, full of suffering and imperfection. Christians give different answers to this question. The answer offered in the present article is in the spirit of personalistic philosophy as I conceive it.

Personalism is the theory according to which the world entirely consists of persons—actual or potential—created by God. An actual person such as man is conscious of absolute values and of the duty to realize them in his conduct, though of course he often fails to do so. Potential persons are beings below the human level—animals, plants, inorganic nature—atoms, electrons etc. A well-known instance of personalism is the philosophy of Leibniz who called the entities created

by God "monads;" I call them substantial agents. Every substantial agent, even one belonging to our realm of egoistic beings and as primitive as an electron, is endowed with free creative power, is capable of developing and eventually freeing itself from egoism, of course after a long series of reincarnations. Vivekananda's doctrine that an amoeba after a number of reincarnations will become man may be found in Leibniz's philosophy. Leibniz is reported to have said once, after drinking coffee in company of friends, that perhaps some of the monads in that coffee will one day become human beings. A similar view is held by N. Lossky.

The world is so wisely ordered that the evil born of egoism contains the conditions of overcoming it,³ so that after a series of reincarnations every being will free itself from egoism, become worthy of deification by grace and enter the Kingdom of God. Thus all shall be saved and become happy creators of absolute good. We can therefore understand why God created persons which, He foresaw, would be egoists in the first period of their life.⁴

Egoism is not simply a mistake, due to insufficient knowledge, but a sin, consisting in a bad direction of the will which prefers the value of one's own self to the value of other persons. Even when we know very well that egoism is an evil, we find it difficult to free ourselves from it by re-educating our will. Conscious of his weakness, a Christian humbles himself before God and asks His help in the struggle with evil in himself and in the world.

In so far as Vivekananda's teaching contains injunctions to struggle against egoism and to cultivate all-embracing love, it is on a high moral level, but his explanation of love for other beings is untenable. He maintains that all individual persons are one and the same being, since at the root of them is Atman, identical in all; hence every evil action committed by an individual—murder, injury etc.—is, according to Vivekananda, an evil directed against oneself. Schopenhauer, who adopted the Hindu doctrine of *tat twam asi* (this is thyself), also bases his ethics upon it.

Criticizing this kind of theories, Metropolitan Antony (Hrapovitsky) says: "let us suppose that the friend I love or my former enemy whom I have forgiven and come to love is my double, my *alter ego*, a

³See N. Lossky, *Les conditions de la morale absolue*.

⁴See N. Lossky, "A Personalist Christian Metaphysic." *Anglican Theological Review* (1957).

momentary appearance of the boundless cosmic whole which partly manifests itself in me as well. Don't you agree that if I really adopted this view, I would immediately lose the holy, exalted feeling of disinterested love for my neighbour, and my former sympathy for him would become as repulsive to me as the sight of a person kissing his own hand or caressing his own image in a mirror?²⁵ And indeed, if there were in the world only one true subject of conduct, help to the suffering would mean caring for oneself, i.e. would be, so to speak, an enlarged form of selfishness. According to the Christian teaching love for other beings is a far more lofty manifestation of our self: it means that knowing another person to be ontologically distinct from myself, I nevertheless defend its interests as though they were my own. Fr. Pavel Florensky in his book *The Pillar and Ground of Truth* has worked out this ontological theory of love.

The fundamental defect of Vivekananda's and other Advaitists' teachings is that they regard cosmic plurality as an evil and find the perfect good in Atman or God alone. Their ideal is that the individual ego, having completely freed itself from earthly attachments, should disappear and be dissolved in Atman. They have no conception of a Divine Kingdom consisting of an infinitude of persons completely free from egoism and from the limitations of biological life, happy in creating and contemplating absolute values of truth, goodness and beauty. Each member of the Divine Kingdom creates something absolutely perfect and at the same time entirely different from that which is created by others.

Every individual self is a being unique in its essence and irreplaceable in value; hence, every individual self is an absolute value. Such a view cannot be held either by Buddhists or by the adherents of the Advaita because of their erroneous conception of the multiplicity of beings. Every kind of multiplicity implies the presence of opposites in the sense that A is not B, is not C and so on. Some opposites are not merely distinct from, but actually contrary to, one another, e.g. two forces directed upon one and the same object from different directions. Such conflicting opposites limit and impoverish life. They are bound up with the existence of evil. But Advaitists and Buddhists are not aware that there is another kind of opposition, for instance between colours, sounds, fragrances, etc. Such opposites are not mutually ex-

²⁵Metr. Antony (Harpovitsky) *Collected Works*, III, p. 173.

clusive and may coexist in the same portion of space and time. They contribute to the richness, complexity and variety of being and may be called "the differentiating opposites." A Christian's ideal is to overcome the conflicting opposition and to further the flowering of life by increasing the fulness and diversity of its good and beautiful contents.

WILLIAM TEMPLE AND THE PROSPECTS OF A REASONABLE CHRISTOLOGY

By ROBERT CRAIG

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Archbishop Temple's teaching on the person and work of Christ is found in his essay "The Divinity of Christ" in *Foundations* (1912),¹ and in chapter eight of his *Christ the Truth* (1924). These two expositions of Christology, which, when compared, show a marked and significant development, are to be understood in the light of Temple's philosophical and theological position as definitively expounded in his Gifford Lectures, *Nature, Man and God* (1934). It is the purpose of this paper to give, with these main sources in view, a critical account of Temple's Christological position and to see the valuable assistance that he can still afford to us today in our attempts to understand the person and the work of Christ.

With the exception of D. M. Baillie's *God Was in Christ*, Protestant thought since Temple's time has largely ignored the fundamental Christological issues which he raises. It is the conviction of the present writer that in the interests both of Christian apologetics and evangelism such issues as, for example, the two natures and the sinlessness of Christ must continue to be examined, and that the Christian revelation, rooted and grounded as it is in the process of history, cannot rest permanently on the mere unexplained assertion of the two natures. And for the same reason the person and work of Christ cannot be understood solely in terms of "the new being" or "the cosmic Christ" if the Christian faith is to be preserved from falling into a new gnosticism through an

¹ed. B. H. Streeter, pp. 211-263.

acceptance of abstract principles as a substitute for historical revelation and the neglect of that not only legitimate but also necessary enquiry into the meaning of the Incarnation. This has been the concern of Christian theologians in all ages whenever they have attempted the double task of understanding the person and the work of Christ and confronting an unbelieving world with His claims. Such questions, which have been the concern of the central tradition of Christian thought throughout its history cannot be dismissed as improper attempts, which ought not to be made, to solve insoluble mysteries, and Temple, who stands in this central tradition, has much to teach us whose concern it may be to work towards a reasonable Christology.

Temple's philosophical presuppositions appear to equip him well for such a Christological enterprise. The relationship between mind and matter, his view of the ultimate significance of human history and of "the sacramental universe" all contribute towards his understanding of the Incarnation. He defines "the sacramental principle" as "a spiritual utilization of a material object whereby a spiritual result is effected."² Everyday experience suggests the possibility of interaction between mind and spirit on the one hand and matter on the other. Temple in fact believed that the unique character of the Christian faith lay largely in the full recognition it gives to the independence and significance of matter. "Christianity is the most avowedly materialist of all the great religions,"³ a phrase of Temple's described by Charles W. Lowry as "one of the most original and daring and at the same time germinal statements in modern theological literature."⁴ The central Christian doctrine is that "The Word was made flesh," and "flesh" is, as Temple points out, a term with particularly materialistic associations. "By the very nature of its central doctrine, Christianity is committed to a belief in the ultimate significance of the historical process, and in the reality of matter and its place in the divine scheme."⁵ Temple's view in this connection both resembles and is differentiated from the dialectical materialism of Engels and Lenin; both assert the temporal priority of matter, both are opposed to the idealist view of matter as existing only for mind; both oppose mechanistic materialism; both regard mind as appearing within matter. But when mind has once appeared its predominance is assured, and dialectical materialism is not, according to

²*Nature, Man and God*, p. 491.

³*op. cit.*, p. 478.

⁴*Christendom*, art. "William Temple." Winter, 1943, p. 36.

Temple, sufficiently dialectical to modify its position in the light of this observed predominance. "If materialism once becomes dialectical, it is doomed as materialism; its own dialectic will transform it into theism."⁶

Here Temple's doctrine of "degrees of reality" emerges. He is careful to point out that this does not mean that some things exist more genuinely than others. There can be no middle term between bare existence and non-existence. What Temple means is that wherever spirit exists at all it naturally possesses controlling efficacy; it expresses its spirituality not by ignoring matter but by controlling it. Spirit is the organic principle of unity in man, and the same is true of the universe. If the universe is a single system then its highest principle of unity is found in spirit.

Thus we can see how Temple's view of the nature of reality as existing in grades prepares the way for his acceptance of the "most central saying" of the Christian faith. "The naturally controlling efficacy of spirit wherever it is present at all" taken with his view of matter gives him "the sacramental principle" and is the ground of his hope in the redemption of man and the world. Herein he has the conviction that by the outworking of this sacramental principle man's total being, material, individual and social, comes within God's plan of redemption. He searches for a conception which is not simply that of the nexus between the eternal and the historical, though it includes that. "It is not simply the relation of ground and consequent, nor of purpose and instrument, nor of end and means; but it is all of these at once. We need for it another name, . . . we may most suitably call this conception of the relation of the eternal to history, of spirit to matter, the sacramental conception,"⁷ and it finds its highest and final expression in the Incarnation of God in Christ wherein God's very being is revealed in His self-expression which in Him is the self-sacrifice of love. "That fact determines the dominant issue of history, which is the prevailing and increasing supremacy of love in all its forms over self-centredness in all its forms."⁸

"The sacramental universe" is thus seen by Temple as preparing the

⁶*Nature, Man and God*, p. 478.

⁷*op. cit.*, p. 490.

⁸*op. cit.*, p. 479.

⁹*op. cit.*, pp. 481-482.

¹⁰*op. cit.*, p. 494.

way for the act of God in the Incarnation. God by no means exhausts His resources in moving according to the laws of nature. Here in the Incarnation we have the invasion of the world by a power in no sense alien to world-process as Temple sees it, in which, in fact, that process naturally culminates. For by this power, according to the Fourth Gospel, "were all things made." Temple here appears to stress that power as immanent in world-process, but he does not fail to see it also as transcendent; the Incarnation is an invasion from above into history, a divine action over and above God's general guidance of world-process by laws, though consistent with them. Yet Temple's whole view of world-process is determinative of his general view of the Incarnation; between the two continuity predominates, and we find his most considered exposition of this subject in chapter eight of *Christ the Truth*.¹⁰

Temple starts by reminding the reader of the context, in world-process and history, in which Christ appears, and he does so in terms of his basic and recurrent concept of reality. Every grade in reality finds its highest expression only when possessed by a higher grade; humanity will reveal its true nature only when it is indwelt by what is higher than itself and supremely when it is indwelt by God. Thus "if in Jesus Christ God lived on earth a human life, then it must be true that in Jesus Christ we shall find two things, . . . the one adequate presentation of God . . . and the one adequate presentation of man—not man as he is apart from the indwelling of God, but man as he is in his truest nature, which is only made actual when man becomes the means to the self-expression of God."¹¹ "Man as he is apart from the indwelling of God"—we see something of this state in lecture fourteen of *Nature, Man and God*. To be a self is not to be evil; evil lies in the self-centredness of the self. Nor does evil consist in the triumph of lawless, evil passions over reason or spirit. "It is the spirit which is evil; it is reason which is perverted; it is aspiration itself which is corrupt."¹² Temple notes frequently the external, observable, anti-social character of sin, but he shows too a keen and realistic appreciation of its deep roots in human nature which has a bias leading man to prefer "the apparent good" to "the good", to set himself up in ego-centric fashion at the centre of his existence where God only properly belongs. Man is unable of his own power to rescue himself from his

¹⁰pp. 147-183.

¹¹*op. cit.*, p. 148.

¹²*Nature, Man and God*, p. 368.

ego-centric, sinful predicament. His only hope of deliverance lies in God who in Christ saves man by uprooting him from himself as centre. In Christ man finds his true centre in God, and at the same time sin's anti-social manifestations are destroyed, and man is placed in his right relationship to his neighbour. There is thus in Temple's thought a clear connection between soteriology and sociology, for it is through the work of Christ that man is placed in his proper relationship to God and to his fellow-men. Temple's Christian social teaching thus rests on his account of the person and work of Christ, which we shall now examine.

The *Foundations* essay, "The Divinity of Christ," belongs to what, for want of a better name, we may call the most liberal period of Temple's thought; for at this point the contemporary idealist philosophy had its strongest influence on him. In *Christ the Truth* we note a significant move towards a more orthodox account of the person of Christ. In the earlier work Temple expounds the divinity of Christ as shown in His complete identification of His will with the purpose of God. Ever since Paul of Samosata's unsuccessful attempt in the third century to see Christ's divinity in the identification of His will with God's will, theologians have fought shy of such a Christology. The concept of will has (as by Paul of Samosata) been distinguished from substance. "We shall not," says Temple, "distinguish between will and substance."¹³ Will is the only substance there is in a man. Temple here makes a salutary insistence that there is nothing merely fragmentary and adjectival in his concept of will and that it has substantial quality. He further makes that vital distinction which, as we shall see, he fails to make in *Christ the Truth*, that "Christ's will, as a subjective function, is of course not the Father's will; but the content of the wills—the purpose—is the same. Christ is not the Father; but Christ and the Father are one. What we see Christ doing and desiring, that we thereby know the Father does and desires. He is the man whose will is united with God's."¹⁴ Here Temple rejects the Chalcedonian definition of the two natures as "in fact, a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek patristic theology . . . it represented the breakdown of theology."¹⁵ But in *Christ the Truth* Temple materially modifies this rejection, "this great formula (the Chalcedonian) derives part of its

¹³*Foundations*, p. 247.

¹⁴*op. cit.*, p. 248.

¹⁵*op. cit.*, pp. 230-231.

value from the clearness with which it refuses to explain."¹⁶ And in the footnote on the same page we read, "It is not really the formula, but the history of the whole controversy, that leaves the impression of bankruptcy. The formula did exactly what an authoritative formula ought to do: it stated the fact." But must we not protest that Temple here, in accepting as satisfactory mere affirmation of "the fact", has prematurely abandoned the attempt begun in the *Foundations* essay to give a reasonable account of the person of Christ? "Surely," wrote A. S. Pringle-Pattison, "it is a futile procedure to reaffirm a fact, when the question is in what sense the fact is to be understood, what intelligible meaning it holds for us . . . what is a fact, we must reply, apart from some interpretation of its meaning?"¹⁷ Must we not observe that Temple's Christological position in *Christ the Truth* constitutes an abdication, not only from the earlier argument in *Foundations*, but also from his central theological and philosophical position? In this observation the present writer is confirmed by these words in a letter received recently from Canon Charles E. Raven of Cambridge, "I have always regarded the Christological argument in *Christ the Truth* as marking the point at which Temple ceased to think things out for himself and became content to make a pattern out of the thought of others."

Here we would do well to ponder Temple's own words of warning to those who engage in Christological speculation, "If any man says that he understands the relation of deity to humanity in Christ, he only makes it clear that he does not understand at all what is meant by an incarnation,"¹⁸ though the effect of this warning is substantially diminished by these words on the same page, "Even had there been no evil in the world to overcome, no sin to be abolished and forgiven, still the Incarnation would be the natural inauguration of the final stage of evolution. In this sense the Incarnation is perfectly intelligible; that is to say, we can see that its occurrence is all of a piece with the scheme of Reality." But between the two mutually exclusive views of the Incarnation as completely intelligible and completely unintelligible there lies the attempt, begun by Temple in *Foundations*, and apparently abandoned in *Christ the Truth*, to apprehend something of the mystery of God in human flesh. Christian theology today is called to take up

¹⁶p. 159.

¹⁷*Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 246.

¹⁸*Christ the Truth*, p. 166.

the Christological enquiry at the point to which Temple has so penetratingly led; it cannot disavow its historic and continuing task to strive towards a reasonable doctrine of Christ's person and work, recognizing always that, while no fully adequate Christology can be formulated, there is real possibility of progress from the less to the more adequate.

A closer examination of the Christology of *Christ the Truth* confirms that Temple, like a good deal of present-day protestant orthodoxy, became content, after the fashion of an authoritative formula, to affirm the fact of the two natures in Christ without enquiring critically as to how the so-called fact is to be understood. What we are bound to look for in any even remotely adequate account of the two natures is the assertion that Christ was not only Man but *a man*. Any doctrine of impersonal humanity must be dismissed as no solution and a contradiction in terms. Of the two constituent natures in Christ's person, the Divine and the human, we may begin by saying that while we are unable to define adequately the former, the latter is known to us by introspection into our own nature. If the humanity of Christ was real then it must not have been qualitatively different from our own. We are finite human subjects—this is what we may call our essence, speaking in ontological terms. Now Temple emphasizes that Christ's humanity was real, but we search in vain for recognition of His essence and experience as that of a finite human subject. Temple never explicitly says so; in fact in expounding Christ's humanity he says that though there was real struggle and real cost "there was no enemy of self-will within, and therefore no danger of defeat,"¹⁰ and he goes on to say "there is nothing to puzzle us here." Is this absence of the "enemy of self-will within" consistent either with the Gospel record or with our own independent idea of human nature? Do not the baptism, the temptations and the Gethsemane experience of Christ point to the certainty that the moral struggle was more than a spectacle only if there was there and then (in the temptations and in Gethsemane) the possibility that Christ might have succumbed to evil? We have to assert that if Christ was a real human being there was some element of self-will within. This self-will He overcame by the grace of God. Self-will is an essential part of our nature as finite human beings, and we can distinguish between self-will which is essential and sin which is incidental. Surely it must be seen that early and late in Christ's

¹⁰*op. cit.*, p. 177.

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ministry his true humanity, as we have described it, is shown in the Gospel record. Is it not a tendentious and artificial interpretation of the baptism of Christ which pictures Him as by His very constitution exempt from the need that brought sinful men and women to John on the Jordan bank? That Christ was sinless is not the issue; but that the enemy was present within, as it is in each one of us, is essential to His true humanity. He on whom at the Baptism God had openly set His approval was in His perfect humanity without sin. He who, according to the Gospel record, in Gethsemane pleads, "Take this cup from me" is empowered by the grace of God to say "nevertheless not what I will but what thou wilt." Here is Divine Grace at work—a man by the Grace of God without sin. Men are not sinners because they are men, for sin cannot be seen as merely actualized human freedom. Yet we must say that the concept of the Fall and Original Sin, in its individual and social significance, leads us to assert that no human being is exempt from its tragic claim. This is "the enemy within" and among us all; and in Christ, "the second Adam," this claim is met, resisted and overcome. Temple, like much of protestant orthodoxy of today, accepts the concept of the God-man as an irreducible antinomy. Ought we not, like the truly biblical view of the God-man relationship, to think dialectically and see that God both transcends and is in man, that He is the beyond *that is akin*, that there is divinity in man (for he is made in God's image), and humanity in God, that the whole truth of the Christian doctrine of the relationship between God and man has not been stated when the divine transcendence has been affirmed? In any case Temple's philosophical argument surely leads him to such a view which is consistent with the biblical account of the God-man relationship. His doctrine of degrees of reality and emergent world-process commits him to view God and man in its light. He sees that Greek thought, in positing an irreducible antinomy between matter and spirit, and in seeing God as apathetic, uncondescending and unredemptive, excludes the doctrine of the Incarnation of God in Christ. One of Temple's major concerns in *Foundations* and in *Christ the Truth* is to work towards a reasoned doctrine of the person and work of Christ. He makes very significant progress towards his objective and then, as we have seen in *Christ the Truth*, he suddenly capitulates. Here is a fact, he says, that God became man, and we must either accept or reject it; we must not try to explain it. Temple's capitulation is repeated today in those theologians to whom "making sense of the Incarnation"

is anathema and in whom Christian theology, in this respect at least, has forsaken its proper evangelical function of proclamation, mediation, interpretation and integration.

We have seen some of the theoretical objections to Temple's unfortunate conclusion to his promising premises and argument; we turn now to consider the practical significance of the vital issue at stake. Why should we be concerned as to whether or not Temple has a satisfactory account of Christ's humanity? It is not a purely theoretical issue, for like all the fundamental truths of the Christian faith it is relevant in a unique fashion to the life of man. From an ethical and social point of view we have a vital interest to defend in insisting that if Christ's humanity was real, His experiences were human in that they were the experiences of a finite human subject. If the subject of the experience is God, then Christ's experience only *resembles* the human and there is no real community between Him and us. God and Christ must be seen as two subjects, not one, and the "unity" between them, of which Temple speaks, must be that of harmony of will or purpose. If "the unity of God and man in Christ" means that the subject of the human experience of Jesus was God, how can Temple assert that the Son of God made our condition the matter of His own experience?²⁰ Sympathy with our condition is something, but not enough. If we are to have point of contact with Christ we need nothing less than what is set before us in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "... in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." Christ must be of the same matter as ourselves if His victory by the Grace of God is to be really relevant to us in our struggles, if the Christian faith is to be saved from degenerating into gnosticism and the worship of a demi-god.

It is then, we submit, to be profoundly regretted that in *Christ the Truth* Temple's move is retrograde, that he becomes "content to reaffirm the fact" of the Incarnation. We are bound to accept his warning against vainly imagining that we can comprehend adequately its mystery. But we must submit that it is premature to abdicate from critical enquiry just after we have stated the doctrine of the two natures. The Adoptionist attempts a solution by picturing Jesus as first a man and then, by his human achievement, God. But the paradox of Grace which calls us to see God active in every human accomplishment and yet emphasizes, as against the Docetists, the vital significance of Christ's real humanity, recalls us to the basic antinomy. And by the same token

²⁰*op. cit.*, p. 172.

let us cease to speak of *human* achievement, either of Christ or of ourselves, and in the light of the paradox of Grace see no achievement as only human, and emphasize the reality of spiritual struggle and moral decision as no mere spectacles, but as hard-won fights for victory. See with St. Augustine, Christ's victory and ours in the light of the same paradox of Grace, "The Saviour, the man Christ Jesus is Himself the brightest illustration of predestination and grace. Every man, from the commencement of his faith, becomes a Christian by the same grace by which *that* man from His formation became Christ."²¹ See the paradox of Grace in Him who "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin," and know thus both Christ's community with ourselves (for He is one of us), and His power to redeem (for He is God Incarnate) He is our brother and our Redeemer, who, in the words of Irenaeus "became what we are in order that He might make us what He Himself is."²²

Let us reiterate in conclusion the necessity of conceiving Christ's ontological status as being that of a finite human subject. Temple recognizes this necessity in *Foundations*: he does not in *Christ the Truth*. If Christ was not one of us, His teaching indeed continues, it may well be, to have spiritual, ethical and even social significance, as does the teaching of other founders of great religions. But it ceases to have direct relevance to our actual tragic human situation. There can be in it no hope, and worse, no power, flowing from Christ's victory over evil whereby we also may gain that victory. His words, "I have overcome the world," become the triumphant utterance of a demi-god to whom the changes and chances of human existence were unproved and therefore unconquered. If the Christian faith is to have a social teaching, a doctrine of salvation for men who live in society, that is, who are not disembodied spirits, it is of vital importance to make it clear, as Temple does in *Foundations*, that the human experience of Christ was the experience of a finite human subject. Christ cannot have redeemed what in fact He did not assume. His consubstantiality with God and with us remains the final two-fold test of Christology.

Dr. Karl Barth, in his *Dogmatics in Outline*, has said that "Christology is the touchstone of all knowledge of God in the Christian sense,

²¹*De praedest. sanct.*, I, xv.

²²*Against Heresies*, Book v, Preface

the touchstone of all theology."²³ We may add that the touchstone of Christology is the historic two-fold one to which reference has just been made. For Jesus is known in faith as the Christ in whom God was "reconciling the world unto Himself," and as no alien intruder among men but "the first-born among many brethren."

BOOK REVIEWS

Our Bible and the Ancient Manuscripts. By Sir Frederic Kenyon. Revised by A. W. Adams. Harper and Brothers, 1958. pp. 352. \$6.95.

For years before World War II Sir Frederic Kenyon's *Our Bible and the Ancient Manuscripts* was perhaps the best general introduction, in English, to the textual criticism of the Bible. After the War, in view of Sir Frederic's death and the discovery of the Dead Sea manuscripts, the career of this once authoritative work seemed finished. On p. 48 of the fourth edition (1939) the author, rejecting Shapira's manuscript, with the alleged date 800 B. C., as a fraud, had written: "There is, indeed, no probability that we shall ever find manuscripts of the Hebrew text going back to a period before the formation of the text which we know as masoretic." It is no disgrace to Sir Frederick that he did not foresee the revolution that was shortly to occur in the textual study of the Old Testament. It was totally unexpected, and its unpredictability is still a little terrifying when one pauses to think about it.

Thanks to the expert work of A. W. Adams, to whom the revision was entrusted, the book can now resume its old position. Professor G. R. Driver has contributed a tactful and truthful appreciation of the original author's life, attainments, and achievements. Adams has expanded the book to meet the increase in volume of the material to be considered, and everything he has chosen to include will be recognized as essential to a complete treatment. Conversely, one misses nothing that should be there. It is remarkable how smoothly the old and the new are interwoven, so that the total effect is that of the creation of a single hand. All in all, if Sir Frederic had prepared the new

²³Eng. trans., p. 66.

edition, it would not have been substantially different. Adams has performed a feat of which few writers are capable.

Though the text is surprisingly accurate with regard to factual matters, errors have eluded detection here and there. Compare p. 85, where we are told that the Leningrad Codex "has been selected as the basic text of the fourth edition of Kittel's Hebrew Bible," with p. 87, which contains the correct information that in the *third* and subsequent editions "the Leningrad Codex provides the basic text." According to p. 115 Papyrus 963 is "next earliest" to P. 957, while p. 117 recognizes that Fouad 266 has to be placed between the two. On p. 121 we should read "the text of the current editions of the Septuagint *is*," not "are." A comma is required after "versions" in "the other versions in Middle Egyptian" (p. 137). These trivial confusions can be grievously misleading to a beginner.

Prospective readers will want to know, above all else, what Adams makes of the Dead Sea biblical manuscripts in relation to textual history. The appearance of at least three shapes of text in the manuscripts, the proto-Masoretic, the Septuagintal, and the Samaritan, is correctly interpreted as indicating that "during the last two centuries B. C. and the first A. D. the Hebrew text was more fluid than had been supposed, but nevertheless what was later to become the Masoretic text already existed in an early form" (p. 88). It is then shown that the early versions are still our principal help in determining whether or not the Masoretic text is superior to its rivals. Adams' view is that the authority of the Masoretic text will have to be acknowledged until or unless it is proved that some other "tradition" is textually better.

Certain important questions might have been pursued a little farther, if only in a speculative way. The standard text of the entire Old Testament is final, not initial. How will theology adjust itself to this historical certainty? The ideal purpose of all textual study is to reconstruct the archetype, the text from which all variants are derived. Knowing as much as we have now contrived to learn about ancient methods of composition and transmission, we may indulge the suspicion that the archetype, at any rate for some types of writing, is a fiction. The Masoretic text is not an artificial, eclectic text. In its fundamental character it is older than the period of standardization. How early was it generally preferred, and why? Such problems force

themselves on our attention, notwithstanding the ignorance that makes them at present insoluble.

With regard to the chapters on the New Testament text and versions, the Vulgate, and the English Bible the reviewer will say merely that they have sharpened his previous knowledge and given him fresh information. He lays aside the book with regret and will pick it up again at the first opportunity.

WALTER C. KLEIN

Ancient Semitic Civilizations. By Sabatino Moscati. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1957. pp.254.

The author wisely begins by naming who the Semites were. They were Aramaeans, Assyrians and Hebrews. He shows that they originally came from the Arabian desert and more probably its outskirts. The Babylonians and Akkadians he also takes to have been Semites. They were, however, distinguished from others by a language mostly with vowels not written. In general that which characterized Semitic peoples are language, geography, common social life, being characteristically religious and especially monotheistic—more especially in Judaism and Islam. As Canaanites these Semitic people inhabited that region of Palestine known in the Bible as Canaan, but which in reality is Phoenicia. In Ugarit or modern Ras Shamra, texts have been found which have revolutionized our knowledge of the literature of these Canaanites.

The author shows how Aramaic became so important, taking the place of ancient Akkadian, and becoming in time the official language, and persisted in spite of changes in general culture, being used especially in earliest Christian literature.

The Hebrews, of course, were and are Semites, the chief source of whom is still the Old Testament. At this point in his book, the author should have revised his idea of the origin of the alphabet in the light of what has been discovered and written since the date of its first publication in 1949. And so were the Phoenicians and the Canaanites Semites—the Phoenicians of commercial renown, and the Canaanites, who were the link between the Near East and the classical culture of the West, and whose excellent poetry has been found at Ugarit, as well as excellent examples of the minor arts.

The author has also given us an excellent account of another branch of the Semitic race, namely, the Ethiopians. The early Yemenite

Semites settled on the north-east coast of Africa among the Habashat tribe, that is the later Abyssinians and the Geez. Christianity is thought to have been brought to that country by two travellers and very soon, about 330 A. D., became the state religion. On the other hand, it was thought to have been brought to the Kingdom of Axum by a group of sailors on their way back from India. Two were carried off as slaves to the royal court of whom one was Frumentius, about 320 A. D., who in time became the first Bishop of the Ethiopic Church. Ethiopic, a Semitic language, became the dominating speech. The earliest real literature was the translation of the Bible; and the earliest and most famous biography in Ethiopic is still that of Takla Hâymânôt about 370 A. D. Ethiopic art is represented by many Churches on the model of the Greek-Roman basilica; by the beautiful Obelisk at Axum; and by the famous rock-cut churches of Lalibela.

The Arabs, an ancient Semitic people, expanded from Palestine to what became the Arabian desert and its outskirts, going ultimately to China, Africa, Spain and France. But their ancestral home in time came to be considered that of the Minaeans, Sabeans, in Hadramaut and Kataban of South Arabia—at first rich in names of deities who represented all aspects of life. These conditions continued until the time of Mohamed and his god, Allah—who alone was recognized as a god, with Mecca as his sacred city and the Koran as his bible.

To the South-west of Palestine, in Egypt, there was a considerable penetration of Hebrew-Semites, in the time of Jacob, which lasted for over four hundred years; and to the North-west there was the mighty Semitic Kingdom of Assyria, famous for her law-codes, which however were greatly influenced by the law-codes of the Sumerians, a non-Semitic people, whose mythology and lyrics form the background of most of those of Babylonia and Assyria.

With the aid of excellent pictures, drawings and maps, the author of this book has demonstrated that the people of Mesopotamia were the best in art of all the Semitic peoples, and his clear demonstration of this in picture and definition shows that he himself is at heart a true artist—he refers to the famous Stele of Naram Sin as magnificent and majestic. This book can be recommended as one of the very best small volumes to be found on the Ancient Semitic Civilizations.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

- Katholische Reformation.* By Hans Asmussen, Ernst Fincke, Max Lackmann, Wolfgang Lehmann, and Richard Baumann. Stuttgart: Schwaben-Verlag, 1958, pp. 239.
- August Hermann Francke und die Anfänge der ökumenischen Bewegung.* By Erich Beyreuther. Hamburg: Herbert Reich, 1957, pp. xi + 309.
- L'Abbé Paul Couturier, Apôtre de l'Unité chrétienne.* By Maurice Villain. Paris: Casterman, 1957, pp. 380.

Of all the designations proposed to characterize this century, none fits better from the Christian viewpoint than "Ecumenical Century;" the formation of the World Council after so much preparatory work, and the concerted missionary activity of bodies whose doctrinal differences might have prevented it a century ago are but a couple of the features indicating how apt this designation is. If this official expression of unity on the part of various bodies merits this name, other movements deserve equal credit in accounting for the climate in our generation. This generation has particularly distinguished itself by probing the depths of the movement in which the Church is engaged; Christians are not satisfied merely to "be ecumenical" for they are also concerned with reasons for their doing so and the historical background of their current activities. The titles at the head of this article show these features in a very clear way; they are, however, but a small sample of the great and increasing quantity of such literature now being published in almost every part of the *oikoumenê*. Lacking an English language equivalent of either *Theologische Rundschau* or *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, we need occasionally to take a summary look at what is going on about us.

Ever since the sixteenth century conversations among Christians of non-Roman bodies have been carried on with little or no reference to the Roman Catholic Church; the reasons for blocked traffic along the highways leading from the centers of Protestantism, Anglicanism, and Orthodoxy are so well known that they need no reiteration here. What is perhaps less well known is that in certain parts of Europe a good deal of traffic flows along secondary routes of communication between Romans and non-Romans; as the first and third titles at the head of this review show, some European Roman Catholics and Protestants appear to treat each other like mature and responsible Christians. This can be explained in part by the somewhat different attitudes taken by Roman Catholics in certain areas of Europe, but part of the explanation lies also in the greater maturity of representative Protestant scholarship on the Continent. Numerous other factors operate effectively, however, to altar the stance of both parties to the debate in

those regions. An excellent example of the way in which European Protestants are confronting the Roman Catholic Church is provided by the collection of essays just published under the title, *Katholische Reformation*.

Early in 1954, Dr. Hans Asmussen, Provost of Kiel, in conjunction with some of his fellow Lutheran clergymen, issued the first of a series of open letters under the general title, "Die Sammlung;" many of these have been translated into English by members of the *Unitas Association* and published in their quarterly journal *Unitas* (The Graymoor Press, Peekskill, N. Y.). To those accustomed to a certain Roman intransigence the response evoked by these little papers is little short of astounding; *Unitas* welcomes these papers and comments upon them and there are frequent references to the exchange in *Istina* (a quarterly journal published at Centra d'Etudes 'Istina', 25 Boulevard d'Auteuil, Boulogne-sur-Seine). The response to these papers within the confines of Protestantism quickly exceeded the fondest hopes of the authors, who had apparently been too cautious in assessing their potential audience; in a very short time, most of the first seven of the pamphlets were out of print, and reprinting them was deemed unwise since most of the authors had more to say on the questions only approached in those earlier communications. The last of the pamphlets, issued under the former auspices, listed twelve "Evangelische Aussagen zu katholischen Wahrheiten," and these expressions elicited questions that were immediately in need of more extensive answers than was possible in these pamphlets. Since practically all of the editors had written before, they were eager to capitalize upon the opportunity of receptive hearers, and the collection of essays resulted.

In one sense, this volume is a monument to a movement; it gives the rationale for the existence of "Die Sammlung," it reproduces *in toto* all seven of the pamphlets that had appeared by the middle of 1957 (*Katholische Reformation*, pp. 26-80), and then in a series of four essays it explores the most significant of the "Catholic Truths" set forth in the last pamphlet, the whole being rounded off by a ringing essay from the pen of Pfarrer Wolfgang Lehmann, pastor at Offenbach a. M. Here we are permitted to see one facet of the many-sided activity known today as the ecumenical movement; if it is carried on outside the World Council, it is none the less an important phase of ecumenical conversation. It is inevitable, of course, that on both sides of this exchange we should detect a certain smugness about "ortho-

doxy," but this should be the occasion of little fear when we recognize that Romans and non-Romans have been badly conditioned for intimate exchange for several centuries; the stance of pronouncement will have to be met sympathetically by either side, and it may result that familiarity will breed facility in creative thinking together.

Key figures in our striving toward unity provide the historic framework of a movement which is not always carried on by official delegates and instructed representatives. Few Christians who have been aware of undercurrents toward unity on the Continent will have to be reminded of the singular contributions of the eminent Roman Catholic, L'Abbé Paul Couturier of Lyons. It is rewarding, nevertheless, to read the comprehensive study of the "Apostle of Unity" by his companion and fellow pioneer, the R. P. Maurice Villain. Père Villain has opened the mind and heart of the founder of the Week of Christian Unity to all who have so ardently desired to know more of this unique priest. As André Latreille has adumbrated in his preface, the Abbé Couturier did much to eradicate from European minds the stereotype of Roman Catholic attitudes toward ecumenism; until the advent of this Lyonnais non-Romans found it hard to avoid the conclusion that although Romans prayed for unity, they meant by unity nothing more nor less than obedient submission to the Roman See. Paul Couturier had a deep consciousness of the sin that infused both sides of the Tiber, and because he was as ready to submit his own position to the judgment of God as that of his conversants, he merits a place in the ancient prophetic succession.

Active as a participant in the arena of Christian Unity for less than a quarter century, the seventy-two year old Paul Couturier had made a lasting impression upon the world whence he departed in 1953. Because he earnestly believed it impossible to realize unity without frank recognition of those matters that sunder the Church, he eschewed facile solutions or provincial answers; consequently, he remained a true party to ecumenical discussion both by listening to those whose traditions differed sharply from his own and by representing the best of his own tradition. The Octave of Christian Unity, of which he was the architect and which has been adopted in so many parts of the world and by so many bodies of Christians, articulated his own conviction that a Church which can learn to pray together may in time learn to think together and eventually even live together. Romans and non-Romans will not be able to sit down at the same table in frank discus-

sion or gather around a common altar tomorrow because of Paul Couturier; we wish it were possible to claim that his life made that possible. Yet the halting approval given to the zealous priest by a naturally conservative hierarchy and the decision to publish this documentary study of his contributions to Church Unity in one of the most active series in French Roman Catholic literature (*Collection Église vivante*) testify that the dedicated life and service of Paul Couturier has been a catalyst in the gradual softening of Roman intransigence.

Admission that this is the "Ecumenical Century" should not blind us to the fact that the vision of a coming great Church was not born in our era. In Erich Beyreuther's historical study of the rôle played by August Hermann Francke in the early eighteenth century awakening we are given several insights into an age which is less often thought of as concerned with ecumenism. The Halle Orphanage run by this amazing man spawned two different forms of ecumenical awakening: the Danish-Halle mission and the Moravian Revival in which Zinzendorf played so large a part. Halle and Copenhagen were linked with the S. P. C. K., in those days, not only in common missionary efforts but also in producing English translations of works accomplished on the Continent; this web of relationship provides an exciting chapter in the early history of striving toward unity while trying to understand what areas of activity could be shared. Doctrinal differences played a less significant part in these relations, largely because the activities undertaken were of a primarily practical concern; they were interested in doing things together in the foreign field and trying to open up a new world for the Gospel. In our own era, the missionary enterprise has proven to be the seed bed of ecumenical relations, but in the eighteenth century it was a driving social and missionary zeal that led to pockets of cross-confessional cooperation. The influence of Halle Pietism is still to be felt in far corners of the world, and some of the factors now confronting us in South India are to be traced to the eighteenth century influence of a movement that began in the zeal of August Hermann Francke.

A steady stream of literature is flowing which will make of the history of ecumenical relations an important discipline in the days ahead. Such survey works as *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948*, by Ruth Rouse and Stephen Neill (S. P. C. K., 1954) give us the larger framework into which the more detailed studies of periods and person-

alities may be inserted. The Rouse and Neill volume devotes only a half dozen pages to the period covered by Dr. Beyreuther in over three hundred pages; the need for both types of work will readily be seen by scholar and teacher alike. Recent years have seen adequate historical studies of several of the figures whose importance to the eighteenth century was only meagerly understood; in the present situation these men and movements have much to tell us of a continuing conversation among committed Christians.

Keeping abreast of the ecumenical conversation in Europe is not easy if one is limited to the books that come to his attention; another source is readily available, however, which can help keep us attuned to the conversation: periodicals. We have already mentioned two in the course of this article; both *Unitas* and *Istina* are Roman Catholic. These journals are both relative newcomers to the field, *Unitas* now being in its tenth year and *Istina* only in its fifth. Another Continental Roman Catholic publication concerned with ecumenism ought also to be mentioned; *Irénikon* (Prieuré bénédictin d'Amay, Chevetogne, Belgium), edited by Benedictines, is now in its thirty-first year of publication, and it covers a much wider field than either of the two previously mentioned including a considerable "Chronique religieuse" and a sizeable book review section in each number. It seems hardly necessary to mention in this connection the well known *Ecumenical Review*, subscription to which is obtainable through the World Council Offices in New York. Less well known perhaps is the *Bulletin Anglican*, published in England under the editorship of W. R. F. Browning of Cuddesdon Theological College, Oxford; this periodical is dedicated to conversation between French and English Christians and is written in French. Those who desire to secure information about subscription to this periodical should contact the Rev'd H. Boone Porter at Nashotah House in Wisconsin; Dr. Porter is the American representative for the journal which belies its modest size by means of the content of its brief articles and reviews. For those who are interested in the American as well as the European side of this conversation, *Cross Currents* (3805 Dovedale Court, Randallstown, Md.) is to be recommended; this journal, now completing its eight year, is a forum where one finds extracts and translations of significant articles from all parts of the world and all fields of inquiry as they relate to Christian conversation. *Cross Currents* is an exciting periodical as a glance at the Summer number of 1958 will reveal; in order one finds an article by Martin Buber, one on

the psychology of grace by Pierre Fransen, S. J., one on literary criticism by Walter J. Ong, S. J., one by J. T. Delos, O. P., on the sociology of war, a reprint of F. Ernest Johnson's article, "Public Education and Religion," which first appeared in *Christianity and Crisis*, and a review of theology during the year by Elmer O'Brien, S. J. The pattern discernible in each of these periodicals is one of a growing maturity in Romanism as well as non-Romanism together with an advancing recognition of the maturity by both sides of the debate.

This brief glance at the literature of ecumenism makes us painfully aware of the great distance we have yet to travel in ecumenical conversation; conversely, however, we gain from it an impression of cautious optimism. There is evident a deep awareness of the need of dedicated study and conversation, but at the same time it is abundantly clear that realism pervades much of the actual conversation, a realism which knows that the task confronting divided Christendom is no simple one. Avoiding the Scylla of despair and the Charybdis of false optimism, Christians are taking up the task as and where they find it, confident that what they can accomplish in this generation may provide a firm foundation for the work to be done by their successors; as they have entered into the labors of their predecessors, they pass on a richer heritage to those who may one day experience what is now only a hope: *ut omnes unum sint*.

JULES LAURENCE MOREAU

Revelation through Reason. By Errol E. Harris. Yale University Press, 1958. pp. xi-158. \$4.50.

This is an expensive little book, but it is well worth spending the money to buy it, mark it, learn from it. Its author is professor of philosophy at Connecticut College; he has previously published a large volume on the general philosophical defense of theism (*Nature, Mind, and Modern Science*), in which he valiantly supported a metaphysic of emergence with idealistic overtones. The present book, first given as Terry Lectures at Yale, is the first Professor Harris has written since coming to this country from his native-land, South Africa. The line of thought is similar to Canon Raven's in his much-neglected but (I think) invaluable Gifford Lectures; the quotations from Raven are frequent and to the point. Professor Harris believes that reason can prepare the way for Christ by giving us a general revelation of God's

purpose in the creation which our Lord then complements, seals, and focusses. I can give this book no higher personal praise than to say that if I had read it before completing recently a large work on Christology I should have used sections of it *in extenso* in my preparatory chapters. But Dr. Harris's book will vastly displease those who decry reason, argue for fideism, and believe that Christ is *absolutely unique* in his revelation of God. Yet the appearance of this book, and several others like it, may be a sign that we are now returning, after a period of extreme anti-metaphysical theologism, to the great tradition in philosophical theology.

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

The Self as Agent. By John Macmurray. Harper and Brothers, 1958, pp. 230. \$3.75.

In the first volume of his Gifford Lectures for 1954, here published, the distinguished professor of moral theology in the University of Edinburgh gives us the prolegomena to his defense of a personalistic theism, based on the activity of man the doer rather than the thought of man the thinker. Thus he proposes to substitute *ago* for the Cartesian *cogito*; and to emphasize that in the activity of man, especially in his personal relationships in which more than his mind is at work, we are given an experience of the basic reality of the universe.

A good deal of this book is taken up with a critique of the thought of Kant and Descartes, while existentialism and logical positivism also come under attack. Dr. Macmurray believes that the former is too egocentric, conceiving the self too much in isolation (but is this really a just criticism? and what existentialists is Macmurray really condemning? certainly not Marcel, nor, for that matter, Jaspers or Heidegger, for they do not take this position which he rightly criticizes). The trouble with logical positivism is that it is too theoretical, regarding the self only in its reflection as shown in language and not in the warm richness of personal experience.

The line taken by Macmurray is a development of his earlier books, especially *Reason and Emotion*, *The Structure of Religious Experience*, and *The Boundaries of Science*. But it is a development and should be read by those who wish to see how Macmurray is moving towards a systematic exposition of his basic view that relationship is the ground for all thought and that this relationship is essentially an active one. Judgment on the system as a whole must await the appearance of the second volume.

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Jerusalem. By Michel Join-Lambert.
Translated by Charlotte Haldane.
Elek Books, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1958, pp. 223. \$5.95.

Jerusalem is a handsome book with lavish illustrations. Precisely why it was considered necessary to publish a text with the illustrations the reviewer is unable to say; possibly the publishers first decided on a price and then resolved to meet the requirements of justice as they understood it. Some such hypothesis is needed to account for the extraordinary step they have taken in putting on the market a drab, uneven history of Jerusalem that dispenses completely with footnotes and discreetly disposes of everything subsequent to 1291 in less than a page. The translator has not improved matters by retaining the French spelling of proper names. If we must have books of this sort, we are entitled to a little entertainment and stimulation from them. The present example lacks both for the present reader.

W. C. K.

Das Hohe Lied, Klagelieder, Das Buch Esther. Übersetzt und erklärt von Helmar Ringgren und Artur Weiser. (Das Alte Testament Deutsch, Teilband 16/2.) Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1958, pp. 144. DM. 6.50 (cloth 9.40).

In his introduction Ringgren dismisses the classification of the Song of Songs as a drama, whether historical or fictional, on the ground that it requires too much transposition of material to obtain the necessary continuity of thought and action. To treat the book as a simple collection of ordinary love lyrics is to

leave unexplained the fact that for the most part the bride takes the initiative. Ringgren therefore argues that the lyrics are, in the last analysis, dependent upon the Tammuz-Ishtar cult. That the Israelites were familiar with this cult may be inferred from the denunciations of the prophets. The lyrics are not however, in their original form. They passed from the cult into common use, and underwent considerable alteration in the course of the centuries. By the time they were brought together into a collection their original meaning had long been forgotten. The fact that the prophets had made use of marriage symbolism to describe relation between God and Israel then gave rise to the allegorical interpretation of the songs along these lines; and it was this interpretation which secured their inclusion in the canon.

Weiser believes that all five of the poems in Lamentations were written in Palestine, the first in all probability shortly after the first fall of Jerusalem in 598, the second, third and fourth soon after 586 and the fifth not many years later. They are the work of one author who was either a priest or a cult prophet. They were written for liturgical use, and their purpose was to restate the fundamentals of Israel's faith in God, in the face of national catastrophe, and to bring the people penitently to seek from him the grace which alone would make possible the restoration of their relationship to him. In the exegesis this is argued in detail. The consideration of the significance of the various literary forms employed is particularly good.

The names Mordecai, Esther, Haman

and Zeresh occurring in the book of Esther are markedly similar to Marduk, Ishtar, Human and Seres (=Kiri-Rischa). This can hardly be coincidental. It is therefore probable, Ringgren holds, that they are derived from certain myths connected in some way with the Persian New Year's festival. The Jews in Babylonia and Persia had taken over some of the customs and legends associated with this observance, including the legends of Esther and Mordecai, which may originally have been independent of each other. These customs and legends they worked together to form the book of Esther, probably because the New Year's festival had on one occasion been marked by an outbreak of persecution. The exegesis aims to substantiate this view, with considerable success.

C. A. S.

The Book of Tobit: An English Translation with Introduction and Commentary by Frank Zimmerman. (Jewish Apocryphal Literature.) Harper & Brothers for The Dropsie College, 1958, pp. xii + 190. \$5.00.

The introduction begins with a synopsis of the Book of Tobit, followed by a consideration of the folk themes it contains and its treatment of them, as clearly indicating that "the Tobit tale was evolved in a long process of story telling." An examination of the evidence as to the place and date of composition, with reference to the opinions of earlier scholars, leads to the conclusion that the book was written in Antioch about the middle of the second century B. C., chapters 13-14 being some two hundred years later. The style of the Greek suggests, if it does not indicate, that it was originally written in Aramaic, then translated into Hebrew and from Hebrew into Greek. The Greek text used is that of Sinaiticus, edited by Rahlfs, but the translation takes account of modifications from Vaticanus

and other recensions, explained in the critical notes. The commentary is brief but useful. There are seven appendices, one of which deals with the versions of Tobit, their character and relationship; another presents further evidence for an Aramaic original; and a third gives the text of Vaticanus.

C. A. S.

Samaria the Capital of the Kingdom of Israel. By André Parrot. Philosophical Library, 1958, pp. 143. \$2.75.

Volume VII of Studies in Biblical Archaeology must have been one of the most difficult of the lot to write, but Professor Parrot has done it again with signal success and distinction. The ivories, which according to Professor Parrot were applied to the furniture, not to the walls, of the palace; the informative ostraca; and a succession of structures, beginning with the palaces and walls of the Israelite kings and continuing down to the Christian and Moslem periods, are explained to us in a manner that enables us to follow the flow of life in this fabulous city. The entire history is told, sometimes with too generous an inclination to trust the documents, but always with due advergence to the whole of professional opinion. An exceedingly competent book!

W. C. K.

Babylon and the Old Testament. By André Parrot. Philosophical Library, 1958, pp. 166. \$2.75.

For usefulness, compactness, clarity, and balance it would be hard to match Studies in Biblical Archaeology, a series of which this is the eighth volume. In almost uncanny fashion Professor Parrot seems to divine precisely what the majority of his readers would like to know. His treatment of Babylon, while oblivious of nothing important in the long history of the city, is heavily and rightly weighted on

the Old Testament side. The complicated evidence is presented in such a way that one can reject some of Professor Parrot's views and still profit immensely by reading the book. The date 538 (p. 80) should be 539, should it not, as the author himself says in two places (pp. 80, 120)?

W. C. K.

Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Ed. by Gerhard Friedrich. Vol. VI. Lfg. 11-12, *pragmoprosphatos*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958, DM 4.60 each.

The two new installments of *ThWB* contain some of the most important articles in the dictionary. Among prepositions, *pro* and *pros* are thoroughly handled, and the article on *presbuteros* is one that ought to be consulted by every student interested in church history or church unity—as well as in the NT. Other points of interest (among many) are: *praxis*, in the title of Acts, *may* mean “experiences” of the apostles—not “acts,” for the subject of the book is not the work of the apostles but that of the exalted Lord.—The scattered usage of *prais* (some N.T. writers avoid it) reflects different theological views and emphases (p. 649).—*Presbutis* (in Phm. 9) is probably not ‘ambassador’ but ‘old man’, according to Prof. Bornkamm (p. 683). The RSV has the former, which makes far better sense of the context—an ambassador, in bonds!—John 10 marks a sharp revision in the idea of the sheep and shepherd, as used in the OT (p. 691).—*Prokopē*, a good Stoic word borrowed by the Christians, has no 19th century connotations of inevitable progress!—*Prosēlutos* clearly distinguishes proselytes from God-fearers, as the book of Acts does, and quite rightly. The Jews did not look upon pagan adherents who refused to come all the way as virtu-

ally Jews: they were still pagans. Even so, some of the rabbis spoke very favorably of them, e. g. Rabbi Jehoshua (ca. 90 A. D.), who said, “There are righteous persons among the nations (=Gentiles) who will have a share in the World to Come” (Tos. Sanh. 13:2; Bab. Sanh. 105a). Rabbi Meir (ca. 150) said: “A goy (Gentile) who keeps the Torah is in the sight of God like the high priest himself!” (Siph. Lev. 18:5 etc.; cf. Strack-Billerbeck, II. 719ff.; ThWB VI. 741). These are two sayings we might do well to remember today when ancient Judaism is often represented as totally narrow and exclusive.

F. C. G.

Jesus' Promise to the Nations. By Joachim Jeremias. Studies in Biblical Theology No. 24. Alec R. Allenson, Inc. pp. 84. \$1.75.

In an age of unparalleled Jewish missionary activity, it is striking that the only utterance of Jesus on that subject which we possess is one of condemnation (Mt. 23:15). More perplexing and embarrassing to the Christian world mission are two other sayings of Jesus, forbidding his disciples during his lifetime to preach to non-Jews (Mt. 10:5 f.), and limiting his own activity to Israel (Mt. 15:23). These “three important negative conclusions,” as Jeremias terms them, are counterbalanced by a corresponding number of “positive conclusions,” viz., that Jesus removed the idea of vengeance from the eschatological expectation (e. g. Lk. 4:16 ff., citing Is. 61:1 f.); that he promised Gentiles a share in salvation (e. g. Mt. 25:34 ff.), and included them in his redemptive activity (e. g. Mk. 10:45, contrasted with Dan. 7:14). Thus far the author's study leads to what appears to be a complete contradiction, which he attempts to resolve by setting still another saying of Jesus (Mt. 8:11 f.) in relation to such prophecies as Is. 2:2 ff.; Mic. 4:1

ff. That Jesus read in his Bible of an eschatological pilgrimage to mount Zion, which was a response to an epiphany and call of God, and included worship at the world sanctuary and a messianic banquet, is evidenced from numerous Old Testament passages, which are echoed in his own words. In his conclusion, Dr. Jeremias leaves the reader to ponder the significance of two italicized assertions: (1) "*Even Jesus himself did not make the world Christian, but he died on the cross.*" (2) "*The missionary task is part of the final fulfillment . . . an eschatology in process of realization.*" A short, but meaty study, such as we have become accustomed to expect in this excellent series.

O. J. F. S.

Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead. By Oscar Cullmann. The Macmillan Company, 1958, pp. 60. \$1.25.

Published already in the *Festgabe für Karl Barth* (*Theologische Zeitschrift*, XII (1956), 126-56), this essay was given by its author as The Ingersoll Lecture on the Immortality of Man for 1955. Introduced by a more apt preface which reflects the response called forth by the

essay, the American edition is substantially a translation of the German original.

On the basis of his exegesis of the New Testament, Dr. Cullmann can find no basis for an early Christian belief in immortality in the Greek mode; his contrast is between a Greek view to which death is a friend and a Jewish Christian view to which death is an enemy to be defeated. His study is strictly biblical, and he uses the New Testament documents as illustrative of the faith of the growing community; he rightly asks that any refutation of his thesis be equally grounded in a study of those documents.

There has been so much imprecise thinking on this subject resulting in confused preaching that one is moved to applaud the clarity with which Dr. Cullmann states his case. This monograph, truly *multum in parvo*, should be required reading not only for theological students but also for every preacher before he writes his next Easter sermon. Disagreement with Cullmann may come from those who prefer to read the New Testament in sentimental terms, but no soundly biblical reading of it or the creeds will refute his much needed restatement of a cardinal doctrine of Christian thought.

J. L. M.

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